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Reevaluating Politicized Identity & Notions of an American Political
Community in the Legal & Political Process
Marvin L. Astrada *
Political identity can be viewed as a “historically and culturally specific
discursive formation.” 1
“[I]t is in the nature of political identities, camps, teams, and the
corresponding bundled ideological commitments to threaten ossification and
stasis . . . . This suggests a challenge and an enormous opportunity; it suggests
the possibility of politics as more than a set of struggles and commitments
(read: obligations); it suggests politics as an exploration, a creative enterprise,
and an adventure.” 2
INTRODUCTION
The twentieth and twenty-first centuries have seen the rise and
development of what is commonly referred to as “identity politics.” This
development has profoundly impacted longstanding, traditional notions of a
single “American” political community and national identity through the
disruption of legal process and public policy spaces. Identity politics and its
production of formal, politicized identities as a lodestar for modern
representational politics has assumed a significant role in the conduct of
American politics and, more specifically, notions of what constitutes an
American political community. Politicized identity, as well as competing
notions of what should constitute a “proper” national political community,
has found expression and exerted influence on the political and judicial
system’s law and policy-making capacities.3
*

1

2

3

Marvin L. Astrada (M.A., Ph.D., Florida International University; J.D., Rutgers University Law
School; M.A., C.A.S., Wesleyan University; B.A. University of Connecticut) teaches in the Politics &
History Department at New York University—Washington D.C.
ROSI BRAIDOTTI, THE POST-HUMAN (2013) (ebook), reprinted in THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF THEORY
AND CRITICISM 2327, 2335 (Vincent B. Leitch et al. eds., 3d ed. 2018) [hereinafter NORTON
ANTHOLOGY].
Richard T. Ford, Political Identity as Identity Politics, 1 UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT, 53, 57
(2005).
For a description of what constitutes a judicial system, see generally Sheldon Goldman & Thomas
P. Jahnige, Eastonian Systems Analysis and Legal Research, 2 RUTGERS-CAM L.J. 285 (1970). “A
judicial system can be conceptualized as encompassing all interactions in a society involved in the
authoritative allocation of values by the judicial authorities of specified courts. Values are allocated
by court decisions, procedural rules and court orders.” Id. at 288. Many cases speak to the impact
of politicized identity on the political and legal process and broader political community. See
Obergefell v Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015) (holding that under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and substantive due process the states must provide
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Presently, identity politics in the United States encapsulates a broad
range of theories, norms, and practices, ostensibly located in objective,
universal “shared” group experiences of marginalization and oppression
based on actual or perceived membership in an identity-based group. In the
present political and legal context, rather than organizing on explicitly
sociopolitical or economic belief systems, ideological platforms, or political
party affiliations, many modern political movements and organizations are
explicitly embracing formal politicized identity as a basis both for
participation in and, by virtue of participation, for attempts to define the
broader national political community.4 The foregoing movements typically
aim to declare, clarify, reclaim, and secure sundry rights and freedoms
through the political and legal process. Empowerment and enhancement of a
specific identity-based constituency that has been historically marginalized
within the American political community is part of the modus operandi of
identity-based movements.
The primacy of the identity group is stressed, prioritized, and utilized
as the basis for the exercise of power at various levels of the political, legal,
and socioeconomic hierarchy by elite representatives of a formal identity
group. Power manifests in the articulation and implementation of select
identity groups’ goals and interests being represented in political, legal, and
policy spaces. Power thus manifests in the public sphere as policy constituted
by government pronouncements backed by the financial and coercive power of
the State. Such pronouncements are implemented as policy to effectuate, in
part, interpretations of the general welfare.5 Policy entails a multifaceted
process where the general welfare is conceptualized, defined, and acted
upon.6 Within this process, policy spaces can be viewed as “considerations of
what is expedient for the community.”7 Policy has “consistently, if not always

4

5
6

7

marriage licenses to same-sex couples and must recognize marriages that were legally licensed and
performed in other states); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 745 (2013) (holding that the
1996 Defense of Marriage Act is unconstitutional); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)
(overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)); Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,
659 (2000) (holding that the constitutional right to freedom of association allowed the Boy Scouts of
America (BSA) to exclude a homosexual person from membership in spite of a state law requiring
equal treatment of homosexuals in public accommodations); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635
(1996) (striking down Colorado's Amendment 2, which denied gays and lesbians protections against
discrimination); Bowers, 478 U.S. at 189 (holding that consenting adults do not have a
constitutional right to engage in sodomy in private under Due Process Clause); One, Inc. v.
Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958) (considering the issue of free speech rights with respect to
homosexuality).
See Alex Thompson, 2020 Democrats Are Dramatically Changing the Way They Talk About Race,
POLITICO (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/11/19/democrats-2020-race-identitypolitics-strategy-1000249.
See Theodore J. Lowi, Four Systems of Policy, Politics, and Choice, 32 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 298 (1972).
See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 35–36 (Paulo J.S. Pereira & Diego M. Beltran
eds., 2011) (1881).
Id. at 35.
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explicitly, found authority in peoples’ empirical perspectives about social
consequences. Its most important contribution has perhaps been . . . that law
is most fruitfully conceived as decision in the sense of sanctioned
authoritative choice.”8
Identity is a formidable basis from which to construct a political, legal,
and public policy agenda or platform because it gets at the core of what a
subject perceives itself to be and what its purpose is in the broader political
community. Indeed, political activity is “animated by efforts to define and
defend who I am, or we are, or you are, or hope to be, or hope to be seen to
be.”9 Members—or rather, self-designated or appointed representatives—of
identity-based constituencies ostensibly assert or reassert ways of explaining
and understanding a group’s distinctiveness, experiences, history, and
inclusion and exclusion criteria. The purpose of asserting and propagating a
reimagined or re-appropriated identity is to directly challenge what are
deemed mischaracterizations of out-groups’ experiences and status within
society’s public policy spaces.10 The stated overarching goal of identity-based,
socio-political agendas, as put forth by representatives of an identity group, is
usually to obtain greater self-determination, autonomy, rights, and
recognition of the value and worth of a marginalized group’s experience.11 In
doing so, politicized identity becomes an exercise of power over subjects, in
that individual subjects are, to some degree, compelled to surrender their
autonomy, distinctiveness, complexity, and diversity in service of group-based
identity factions, politics, and movements for the sake of implementing
nationalistic public-policy agendas.12
Identity has become not only a basis for political participation and
representation, but also a means of obtaining and exercising power among
identity-group elites in the realms of law and politics. Identity has become a
8

9
10

11

12

Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Criteria for a Theory About Law, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 362,
372 (1971).
Richard D. Parker, Five Theses on Identity Politics, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 545–53 (2005).
See generally ROGERS BRUBAKER, TRANS: GENDER AND RACE IN AN AGE OF UNSETTLED IDENTITIES
(2016); Rogers M. Smith, Identities, Interests, and the Future of Political Science, 2 PERSPS. ON
POLITICS 301 (2004).
See Michael Walzer, What Does It Mean to Be an “American?”, 57 SOC. RES. 591 (1990); Nadia
Suleman, Young Americans Are Increasingly ‘Uncomfortable’ With LGBTQ Community, GLAAD
Study Shows, TIME (June 25, 2019), https://time.com/5613276/glaad-acceptance-index-lgbtqsurvey/.
From social justice movements anchored by race to artistic expression centering
legacies of pain and pleasure that shape our racial, cultural, and geographic senses of
self, identity is on the rise as a tool that animates both self-affirmation and liberation.
At the same time, identity is prompting severe backlash. From the ‘All Lives Matter’
slogans developed in response to the fight against police brutality to the ambitious calls
for universality in the law, identity politics is characterized as undemocratic,
exclusionary, and harmful to minoritized identities.
Osamudia R. James, Valuing Identity, 102 MINN. L. REV. 127, 128 (2017); see also Jessica Knouse,
From Identity Politics to Ideology Politics, 3 UTAH L. REV. 749, 750 (2009).
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pursuit of an ideological-political program that directly impacts public policy.
As an expression of power, identity politics has (1) profoundly impacted the
fabric of American politics and political culture; (2) affected the political,
legal, cultural, and socioeconomic reality of those who reside within and
without classificatory schema based on identity; and (3) has had a formative
impact on the notion of what comprises an American political community.13
In light of the foregoing observations, this work critically examines the
complexity of the politics of identity, politicized identity, and notions of an
American political community as manifested in the political and legal
process. More specifically, this work analyzes some of the problems, tensions,
and effects of politicized identity vis-à-vis positing an American political
community, as well as the impact that politicized identity has on the
character and content of inclusive representational politics—the medium by
which the American political community is framed and posited. This work
will thus proceed as follows: First, an in-depth analysis of politicized identity
is conducted to frame the discussion and highlight the complexity that
undergirds the politics of identity in the political and legal process. Second,
the enduring problem of identity-based representation and the challenges of
positing a national political community is considered. Third, the multifaceted
relationship between law, politics, identity, and representation is examined.
Fourth, the nuances of politicized identity and the problems that attach to
employing politicized identity in representative politics are identified and
critically analyzed. Lastly, a summary of findings and some observations
pertaining to politicized identity’s role and influence on the political and legal
process, representational politics, and what constitutes an American political
community going forward are provided.
I. WHY REEVALUATE POLITICIZED IDENTITY?
A. Politicized Identity & Political Community in Law, Politics & Policy
A systemic, conceptual analysis reveals the problems that exist in the
political and legal process as far as articulating a nationalistic notion of an
13

See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 647 (1948) (holding that States cannot explicitly subject
citizens of Asian descent to unequal treatment under law based solely on race/ethnic classification);
Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (“[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of
a single racial group are immediately suspect” and are subject to “the most rigid scrutiny.”); Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550–51 (1896) (upholding the constitutionality of racial segregation laws
for public facilities as long as the segregated facilities were equal in quality); The Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was unconstitutional because
Congress lacked authority to regulate private affairs under the Fourteenth Amendment; also, the
Thirteenth Amendment “merely abolishes slavery,” and did not necessarily ban race discrimination
regarding access to public services); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554 (1876)
(declaring that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment apply
only to state action, not to actions by individual citizens).
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American political community via politicized identity groups. Thus, systemic
analysis is warranted because of the insight that can be gained concerning
the overarching political and judicial systems’ ability to confront change and
persist in light of the severe challenges that each is presently facing in what
some commentators have termed a crisis in the integrity of the American
political process and conceptions of a national community.14 Various strains
of politicized identity have manifested, played a substantial role, and
persisted in the present political and legal process and in articulations of an
American political community.15 Politicized identity is a structural variable,
which persists in the political and judicial systems that contextualize, and
which are products and producers of, politicized identity.
[A] principal objective of a political system is to persist—i.e., to
maintain the ability to allocate values for a society and to
induce most members to accept these allocations as binding.
Indeed, the major task of systems analysis is the investigation
of how the system persists. Persistence is not to be confused
with maintenance of the status quo. Persistence is an empirical
concept that recognizes that a static system usually proves to
be incapable of handling demands and maintaining support in
the face of dynamically changing social, economic and cultural
conditions that typify modem societies.16
Politicized identity has informed the various inputs that place
demands on the political and legal process’s outputs concerning the character
and content of an American political community.17 What exactly is a political
community?18 Who is included, who is excluded, and why? In the present
14

15

16
17

18

See generally Fareed Zakaria, Can America Be Fixed: The New Crisis of Democracy, 92 FOREIGN
AFF. 22 (2013); Jonathan Rauch, How American Politics Went Insane, ATLANTIC (Jun. 21, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/07/how-american-politics-went-insane/485570/;
Simon Tisdall, American Democracy Is in Crisis, and Not Just Because of Trump, GUARDIAN (Aug.
7, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/aug/07/american-democracy-crisistrump-supreme-court.
See Bharati Mukherjee, Beyond Multiculturalism, in MULTI-AMERICA: ESSAYS ON CULTURAL WARS &
CULTURAL PEACE 454 (Ishmael Reed ed. 1998); STEPHEN STEINBERG, THE ETHNIC MYTH: RACE,
ETHNICITY, AND CLASS IN AMERICA (1981).
Goldman & Jahnige, supra note 3, at 289.
A “demand” is defined as “an expression of opinion that an authoritative allocation with
regard to a particular subject matter should or should not be made by those responsible
for doing so.” With some political institutions characterizing American politics,
demands can vary broadly in form and content. A riot, no less than a formal petition,
may be perceived as a demand. A self-initiated congressional staff study may be used
as well as presentations by lobbyists. In a judicial system, on the other hand, litigation
is the principal transmitter of demands.
Id. at 290.
[W]hat is it for a group of people to share such an identity? Notoriously there is
considerable disagreement on this question. The most basic difference of opinion is
between ‘subjectivists,’ who maintain that sharing a national identity is simply a
matter of people believing that they belong together for some special reason (perhaps
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milieu of American law and politics, some commentators view the Trump
Administration as representing authentic values, virtues, and norms that
should inform an American political community,19 while others find that the
Administration does not represent the values, norms, and virtues that should
underpin an American political community.20 Inputs in the form of identity-

19

20

because they believe that they have a distinctive shared culture, history, language, or
way of life), and ‘objectivists,’ who argue that in order to share a national identity people
must really possess distinctive common characteristics, such as a shared culture,
history, language, or way of life.”
Andrew Mason, Political Community, Liberal‐Nationalism, and the Ethics of Assimilation, 109
ETHICS 261, 262 (1999); see also Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits
of Race and Sexual Orientation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 263, 266, 282–83 (1995).
Donald Trump is not your regular politician, everyone knows that. But the level of
opprobrium heaped upon him is astonishing despite that personal sacrifice. It bounces
off him, of course, because he's a street fighter in the purest sense and brings with him
a level of ferocity that the political world just can't fathom. Terrorism, rocketing illegal
immigration, economic conflict with China and others: these are the existential issues
that leave America in a perilous position in a very dangerous world. Globalism is under
attack on every continent as a consequence, and it's about time that the United States
had a president that put the nation first. This is what these times demand and this man
has our back. Few people know how capable he is in these situations . . . He's intense,
he's demanding, but it's all driven by his passion to deliver an end product that people
love . . . his approach is quite simple, really . . . he reflected upon a question that he was
often asked: “How did you achieve your success?” He gave a simple response, but it was
one that I still think about often. “I look around, I see what people want and I give it to
them.” That's the Donald J. Trump mantra: give the people what they want.
George Sorial & Damian Bates, Opinion, We Know the Real Donald Trump. America Needs Four
More Years, NEWSWEEK (June 14, 2019), https://www.newsweek.com/trump-sorial-bates-real-dealfour-more-years-1443862.
We can hear the spectacle of cruel laughter throughout the Trump era. There were the
border-patrol agents cracking up at the crying immigrant children separated from their
families, and the Trump adviser who delighted white supremacists when he mocked a
child with Down syndrome who was separated from her mother. There were the police
who laughed uproariously when the president encouraged them to abuse suspects, and
the Fox News hosts mocking a survivor of the Pulse Nightclub massacre (and in the
process inundating him with threats), the survivors of sexual assault protesting to
Senator Jeff Flake, the women who said the president had sexually assaulted them,
and the teen survivors of the Parkland school shooting. There was the president
mocking Puerto Rican accents shortly after thousands were killed and tens of thousands
displaced by Hurricane Maria, the black athletes protesting unjustified killings by the
police, the women of the #MeToo movement who have come forward with stories of
sexual abuse, and the disabled reporter whose crime was reporting on Trump
truthfully. It is not just that the perpetrators of this cruelty enjoy it; it is that they enjoy
it with one another. Their shared laughter at the suffering of others is an adhesive that
binds them to one another, and to Trump. Taking joy in that suffering is more human
than most would like to admit. Somewhere on the wide spectrum between adolescent
teasing and the smiling white men in the lynching photographs are the Trump
supporters whose community is built by rejoicing in the anguish of those they see as
unlike them, who have found in their shared cruelty an answer to the loneliness and
atomization of modern life. The laughter undergirds the daily spectacle of insincerity,
as the president and his aides pledge fealty to bedrock democratic principles they have
no intention of respecting.
Adam Serwer, The Cruelty Is the Point, ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/the-cruelty-is-the-point/572104/.
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based platforms, frameworks, factions, and discourse have had a substantial
impact on the political and judicial systems’ outputs in the form of legislation
and judicial opinions, which directly affect representational politics and
policy spaces.21 A historical exemplar of the power of politicized identity
within the larger political and legal process to deeply shape the notion of an
American political community is evident in the Court’s notorious Dred Scott
v. Sandford opinion.22 The opinion is a powerful example of how
constitutional expressions of political identity and political community can
profoundly affect subjects that reside within the jurisdiction of a political and
judicial system that posits a national community grounded in the
fundamental law. The Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford declared, in part, that:
The words “people of the United States” and “citizens” are
synonymous terms, and mean the same thing. They both
describe the political body who, according to our republican
institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power and
conduct the Government through their representatives. They
are what we familiarly call the “sovereign people,” and every
citizen is one of this people, and a constituent member of this
sovereignty. The question before us is, whether the class of
persons described in the plea in abatement compose a portion
of this people, and are constituent members of this sovereignty?
We think they are not, and that they are not included, and were
not intended to be included, under the word “citizens” in the
Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and
privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to
citizens of the United States. On the contrary, they were at that
time considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings,
who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether
emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and
had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power
and the Government might choose to grant them.23
The Court’s opinion highlights the influence that politicized identity
has on the political and legal process. The remainder of this work, therefore,
contextualizes and analyzes politicized identity, delves into the enterprise of
critically evaluating it, and assesses some of the effects that it has on notions
of an American political community and its expression via representational
politics. The aim is to contribute to a discourse that seeks to better bridge the
gaps between theory and practice, to appreciate and gauge the conceptual
and empirical complexity of politicized identity, to reveal how the conceptual
directly informs the practice of identity politics, and to highlight and
21
22
23

See DAVID EASTON, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM: AN INQUIRY INTO THE STATE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE (1953).
60 U.S. 393 (1857).
Id. at 404–05.
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critically analyze the power-effects of politicized identity in the political and
legal process. An analysis encompassing the foregoing sheds light on the
importance of a “shared national identity [as] a precondition for the existence
of the kind of trust which makes compromise possible in the face of
conflicting interests . . . a shared national identity is a necessary condition for
a politics of the common good and widespread support for redistribution on
grounds of social justice.”24
This work is conceptual in nature as well as comprehensive, in that it
seeks to analyze the sundry nuances and complexities of identity vis-à-vis
politics, law, and notions of an American political community. It subscribes to
Michel Foucault’s characterization of critique:
A critique does not consist in saying that things aren’t good the
way they are. It consists in seeing on what types of
assumptions, of familiar notions, of established, unexamined
ways of thinking the accepted practices are based . . . . Thought
does exist, both beyond and before systems and edifices of
discourse. It is something that is often hidden but always drives
everyday behaviors. There is always a little thought occurring
in the most [banal] institutions; there is always thought even in
silent habits.25
To identify and critically analyze the power effects and impact of politicized
identity on law, politics, and policy spaces is the overarching aim of this
work.
B. Politicized Identity, Representation & American Political Community
Whether politicized identity is pragmatic or inevitable does not exempt
it from critical appraisal. Identity politics continues to have a profound effect
on the following: (1) the definition of a national identity—a common will; (2)
the political, social, and economic actuality of identity groups, sub-groups,
and individual subjects as expressed in the political and legal process; and (3)
the notion of a national political community expressed in representational
politics and public policy spaces. Facets of this examination include an
assessment of whether politicized identity has had a positive effect by
providing marginalized groups with increased political power, or instead a
negative effect by reducing politics to identity-based meta-ideologies that
artificially constrain complex and diverse individuals. In the process of
investigating these facets, this article explores the notion that politicized
identity may not be an effective basis for an inclusive national political
24
25

Mason, supra note 18, at 263.
MICHEL FOUCAULT, So Is It Important to Think?, in THE ESSENTIAL FOUCAULT: SELECTIONS FROM
ESSENTIAL WORKS OF FOUCAULT, 1954–84 (Paul Rabinow & Nikolas S. Rose eds., 1994).
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community, and that it may not be conducive to fostering an American
political community based on democratic representation because, as David
Easton notes, “‘[P]olitical community’ implies ‘at the very least that the
members of the system show some minimal readiness or ability to continue
working together to solve their political problems.’”26
Politicized identity, like most human constructs, has both positive and
negative effects, depending on the lenses one employs to assess and posit
notions of identity and the common will—and weal—of a political
community.27 For example, as one critic of the #MeToo movement’s rallying
cry “Believe All Women” notes: “There are limits to relying on ‘believe all
women’ as an organizing political principle.”28 As noted by a commentator on
the state of social science during the US bicentennial, it is possible that
subjects can become immured in the very device created to purportedly “free”
them.29 Whether or not this is the case, this article contends that identity, in
and of itself, is an influential factor in the articulation and practice of power
in the political and legal process, the public sphere, and the American
political community. Indeed, the successful use of identity in politics has been
“fundamentally rooted in a command of public ideas . . . [written into] not

26

27

28

29

Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, Public Opinion and the United States Supreme Court:
Mapping of Some Prerequisites for Court Legitimation of Regime Changes, 2 L. & SOC'Y REV. 357,
357 n.1 (1968) (quoting David Easton, A System Analysis of Political Life (1965)); see also Roy L.
Brooks, Race as an Under-Inclusive and Over-Inclusive Concept, 1 AFR. AM. L. & POL'Y REP. 9, 20
(1994) (“[T]he traditional civil rights concept of race . . . ignores significant internal divisions of
socioeconomic class, gender, politics, sexual orientation, disability, race-gender intersectionality . . .
and other inter-sectionalities.”); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory,
42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 585 (1990).
There is, first, no such thing as a uniquely determined common good that all people
could agree on or be made to agree on by the force of rational argument. This is due not
primarily to the fact that some people may want things other than the common good
but to the much more fundamental fact that to different individuals and groups the
common good is bound to mean different things. This fact, hidden from the utilitarian
by the narrowness of his outlook on them world of human valuations, will introduce
rifts on questions of principle which cannot be reconciled by rational argument because
ultimate values—our conceptions of what life and what society should be—are beyond
the range of mere logic. They may be bridged by compromise in some cases but not in
others. Americans who say, ‘‘We want this country to arm to its teeth and then to fight
for what we conceive to be right all over the globe’’ and Americans who say, ‘‘We want
this country to work out its own problems which is the only way it can serve humanity’’
are facing irreducible differences of ultimate values which compromise could only maim
and degrade.
Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, in THE DEMOCRACY
SOURCEBOOK 6 (Robert Dahl, Ian Shapiro, & Jose Antonio Cheibub eds., 2003) (discussing
of the complexities and tensions underpinning notions of a common will in a political
community premised on democratic representation).
Bari Weiss, Opinion, The Limits of ‘Believe All Women,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/28/opinion/metoo-sexual-harassment-believe-women.html.
See LOUIS SCHNEIDER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN AMERICA: THE FIRST TWO HUNDRED YEARS 210 (Charles M.
Bonjean, Louis Schneider, & Robert L. Lineberry eds., 1976).
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only public law but into the national consciousness.”30 It is identity’s power to
do this in the context of law and representational politics that is the focus of
this analysis.
Representation, in the American political context, has found unique
and, at times, counter-intuitive expression in politics, law, and public
policy.31 For instance, although representation is the lodestar of the
American constitutional order, the original framework explicitly excluded a
plethora of identity-based groups, such as Black slaves, women, and
American Indians.32 In the modern context, the American constitutional
order continues to suffer from representational deficiency, for example, vis-àvis the vote based on racial and class status and disparity considerations.33
From a political process perspective, representation, in conjunction with
politicized identity and the notion of a “proper” American political
community, may be “the most interesting, the most complex, the most
baffling aspect of any democratic political system, namely, the ascertainment
of public feeling on innumerable public policy issues through the medium of
periodic, partisan selection of district delegates to a multi-membered
representative assembly.”34 Ultimately, the present state of American politics
necessitates an analysis of the very notion of representation—a seemingly
obvious concept that is actually quite complicated and dependent on the
interpretations of different identity-based factions. In the present identity
politics that undergirds the American political system and political culture, it
is important to revisit and reassess the notion of representation in light of the
powerful role that politicized identity has played since the 2016 election.
What does it signify exactly? The signifier of representation seems to be very
different as far as the signifier that identity-based factions seek to
30

31

32

33

34

CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER, Ronald Reagan, in THE POINT OF IT ALL: A LIFETIME OF GREAT LOVES AND
ENDEAVORS 9, 11 (Daniel Krauthammer ed., 2018).
Group-based rights means ‘representational’ group-based rights, or group rights that
assume a sameness of identity among all persons of a designated group. Such rights,
which include social group representation in deliberative political bodies, certain kinds
of affirmative action programs, and race-based legislative districting, are distinct from
group-based strategies that do not implicate identity, such as affirmative action
programs that are justified by, for example, the utilitarian goal of achieving a less raceconscious society.
Anita L. Krug, Note, The Myth of Context in Politics and Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1292, 1292 n.1
(1997).
See Rick Hubbard, Restoring Citizen Representation in Our Democratic Republic: Congress Is
Lagging—Do We Have the Will to Force Change?, 40 VT. B.J. 20, 20 (2014).
See Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018) (holding that the District Court disregarded
presumption of legislative good faith and improperly reversed burden of proof in a case where the
evidence was insufficient to establish that the Texas Legislature acted in bad faith and engaged in
intentional discrimination when it adopted interim redistricting plan approved by the district
court).
Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Reapportionment Perspectives: What Is Fair Representation?, 51 A.B.A. J. 319,
319 (1965).

2020]

Reevaluating Politicized Identity

29

reconfigure or appropriate. The problem with politicized identity and
representation may be that it has the potential to easily fall into ideological
dogma, which can have an adverse impact on the character and content of
representation.35
Although it may provide or seem to provide short or long term
satisfaction for what many may feel is a corrupt political system that has
oppressed groups based on identity traits and status, identity-based factions
may or may not be a less-than-effective basis upon which to engage in
representational politics since politicized identities are “historically created
and historically variable categories.”36 The “I believe” approach, grounded in
an explicitly politicized identity—for instance, wherein belief without any
form of “objective” or empirical evidence may be sufficient to sustain an
allegation of serious misconduct— demonstrates why it is important to assess
how representation and political community manifest in the political and
legal process and in policy spaces.
Politicized identity plays a key role in contouring the form and
substance of what constitutes a political community. Bertrand Russell’s
analysis of the political economy of labor can be applied to politicized identity.
Russell opines that “[t]he uniting purpose exists only in owners and
managers” of politicized identity signifiers “and may be completely absent in
most of those” subjects who are encompassed within a politicized identity
signifier.37 It is important to note that this pitfall applies to politicized
identity in general; race, ethnicity, sexuality, class, religion, and ideology are
exemplars of politicized identity signifiers that all have the potential of
negatively impacting the form and substance of representational politics.38 As
expressed in a recent editorial:
The huntresses’ war cry—“believe all women”—has felt like a
bracing corrective to a historic injustice. It has felt like a
justifiable response to a system in which the crimes perpetrated
against women—so intimate, so humiliating and so unlike any
35

36

37
38

See Athena D. Mutua, Shifting Bottoms and Rotating Centers: Reflections on LatCrit III and the
Black/White Paradigm, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1177, 1182–83 (1999). According to some critics,
“single issues, fixed ideas, [and] single-minded ideologies are dangerous” for the integrity of
representational politics. CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER, Thank You, Isaiah Berlin, in THE POINT OF IT
ALL: A LIFETIME OF GREAT LOVES AND ENDEAVORS, supra note 30, at 15.
Rogers Brubaker & Frederick Cooper, Beyond “Identity,” 29 THEORY & SOC’Y 14, 30 (2000). It has
been contended that, because identity politics “are premised on exclusion from a universal ideal,”
politicized identity requires “that ideal, as well as their exclusion from it, for their own perpetuity
as identities . . . identity structured by this ethos becomes deeply invested in its own impotence,
even while it seeks to assuage the pain of its powerlessness through its vengeful moralizing,
through its wide distribution of suffering, through its reproach of power as such.” Wendy Brown,
Wounded Attachments, 21 POL. THEORY 390, 398, 403 (1993).
BERTRAND RUSSELL, AUTHORITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL 65–66 (1949).
See generally Samara Klar, The Influence of Competing Identity Primes on Political Preferences, 75
J. POLS. 1108 (2013).
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other—are so very difficult to prove. But I also can’t shake the
feeling that this mantra creates terrible new problems in
addition to solving old ones.39
Rigid ideological dogma, the antithesis of a rational rule-based approach to
fostering, enhancing, and sustaining representational democratic politics and
public policy, may have long-term adverse effects on the integrity of
representation.40
II. POLITICIZED IDENTITY: AN INITIAL ANALYSIS
A. The Political & the Legal: Identity & Political Community
The importance of analyzing politicized identity vis-à-vis political
community is that understanding “‘the claims of community’—whether in law
or moral and political theory—is to recognize that, as the phrase itself
suggests, more than one claim is involved.”41 Accordingly, the notion of
community rests on contested terrain. Politicized identity is both product and
producer of an unstable conceptual communitarian terrain.42 In its Dred Scott
opinion, for instance, the Court noted that:
39

40

41

42

Weiss, supra note 28. In the case of the “believing all women” standard for adjudging allegations of
sexual misconduct, generally and specifically, Weiss also suggests that such a posture:
can rapidly be transmogrified into an ideological orthodoxy that will not serve women
at all. If the past few weeks have shown us the unique horrors some women have faced,
the answer to it can’t be a stringent new solidarity that further limits the definition of
womanhood and lumps [women’s] highly diverse experiences together simply based on
our gender. I don’t think that helps women. Or men. I believe that the “believe all
women” vision of feminism unintentionally fetishizes women. Women are no longer
human and flawed. They are Truth personified. They are above reproach. I believe that
it’s condescending to think that women and their claims can’t stand up to interrogation
and can’t handle skepticism. I believe that facts serve feminists far better than faith.
That due process is better than mob rule.
Id.
See Peter H. Schuck, Against (And For) Madison: An Essay in Praise of Factions, 15 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 553, 568–69 (1996).
Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law, Politics, and the Claims of Community, 90 MICH. L. REV. 685, 688
(1992).
Perusing innumerable definitions, one discovers that democracy has become an altar
on which everyone hangs his or her favorite ex voto. Almost all normatively desirable
aspects of political, and sometimes even of social and economic, life are credited as
intrinsic to democracy: representation, accountability, equality, participation, justice,
dignity, rationality, security, freedom . . . the list goes on. We are repeatedly told that
“unless democracy is x or generates x . . . .” The ellipsis is rarely spelled out, but it
insinuates either that a system in which governments are elected is not worthy of being
called ‘‘democracy’’ unless x is fulfilled or that democracy in the minimal sense will not
endure unless x is satisfied.
Adam Przeworski, Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense, in THE DEMOCRACY
SOURCEBOOK 12 (Robert A. Dahl, Ian Shapiro, & Jose Antonio Cheibub eds., 2003).
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It is very clear, therefore, that no State can, by any act or law
of its own, passed since the adoption of the Constitution,
introduce a new member into the political community created
by the Constitution of the United States. It cannot make him a
member of this community by making him a member of its own.
And for the same reason it cannot introduce any person, or
description of persons, who were not intended to be embraced
in this new political family, which the Constitution brought into
existence, but were intended to be excluded from it.43
The Court’s notions of political community were reconfigured after the
Civil War, yet a perusal of the latest local and national news media indicates
the United States continues to struggle with who and what constitutes an
American political community.44 Political community, though nationalistic in
nature at the level of high politics, nonetheless has manifold localistic claims
as to what constitutes community rather than there being a singular,
authentic political community that all subjects must conform to. Multiple
claims made by various subcommunities within the polity, which characterize
the politics of politicized identity, may therefore be in line with a fragmented
yet functional overarching political community that is defined less by what it
has in common and more by the diversity of differences that permeate the
multiplicity of communitarian-based claims.
Identity, like claims of community, is dynamic. It provides the context
for the political and legal process and involves a continual negotiation
between representation and actual policy spaces, such as judicial opinions or
legislative acts.45 Such policy spaces assume a “real” quality, providing
tangible, functional, but malleable concepts and ideational frameworks to
ground and structure a sense of authentic identity and community.46 Notions
of self are defined in policy spaces drawn, in turn, from cultural ordering
mechanisms such as religion, nationalism, patriotism, political and economic
43
44

45
46

Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 406 (1857).
See, e.g., Katie Rogers & Nicholas Fandos, Trump Tells Congresswomen to ‘Go Back’ to the
Countries They Came From, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/14/us/politics/trump-twitter-squad-congress.html.
See PHILIP E. STEINBERG, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE OCEAN 207 (2001).
Many writers go further and characterize liberal assumptions about value consensus as
devious and repressive. The dominant groups in society, on this view, universalize their
interests and experience and repress the self-expression of groups (e.g. women and minorities)
without power. According to Robert Gordon, one can represent law as a legitimating ideology
in the view that “[t]he ruling class induces consent and demobilizes opposition by masking its
role in widely shared utopian norms and fair procedures, which it then distorts to its own
purposes” . . . Gordon himself seems to proffer an account wherein these preferences are
concealed even from the actors themselves because “[t]he discourse of law-its categories,
arguments, reasoning modes, rhetorical tropes, and procedural rituals-fits into a complex of
discursive practices that together structure how people perceive.
Thomas Morawetzt, Understanding Disagreement—The Root Issue of Jurisprudence: Applying
Wittgenstein To Positivism, Critical Theory & Judging, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 375, n.5 (1992-1993).
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systems, norms, morals and values, and most importantly, formal politicized
identity.47 Policy spaces, such as judicial opinions, situate subjects in the
world; they provide contextual parameters that shape the contours of human
experience, which provides a fulcrum by which experience is translated into
an identarian placeholder for a subject’s self-perception. Humans construct
identity via their interactions and their external experiences with and in
space-places, wherein “authentic” meaning resides.48 Policy spaces enable the
transposition of internal, subjective, and human psychical processes onto the
external world.
Identity—wherein it can be grasped and contemplated, rendered
constative, concretized and communicated—assumes a cardinal role in the
constitution of human affairs. Multifaceted experiences provide fodder for the
transformation of identity into a political medium, effectively creating
attachments that, in turn, provide meaning for subjects.49 Identity is
culturally mediated, as are the socialization processes utilized by politicized
identity groups to procure attachment and fidelity to the political, ideological,
and normative agendas advanced by the elite within a politicized identity
group.50 The trappings of politicized identity involve the potential for it to
become an exclusive means of comprehending and understanding authentic
identity in the political milieu.51 The act of authoritatively naming creates
meaning and subjective attachment. Identity enables subjective attachments
to political agenda and ideological interpretations of group interests, goals,
and the “proper” means by which to obtain these goals. A pitfall of relying
upon formal politicized identity groups in a representative democratic
political system may be that the foregoing can have the potential effect of
restricting subjects to fit within the parameters of the identity, or that the
interpretation of identity by certain elite representatives does not necessarily
reflect the actual subjects that are emplaced in the identity signifier.52

47
48
49

50

51

52

Id.
See generally YI-FU TUAN, SPACE AND PLACE: THE PERSPECTIVE OF EXPERIENCE (1977).
See Peter Berkowitz, The Court, the Constitution, and the Culture of Freedom, POL’Y REV., Aug.–
Sept. 2005, at 3, 23, https://www.hoover.org/research/court-constitution-and-culture-freedom.
See generally BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGINS AND
SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (3d ed. 2006).
See Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law, Politics, and the Claims of Community, 90 MICH. L. REV. 685, 688
(1992).
See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141–42 (1873) (“The paramount destiny and mission of
woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.
And the rules of civil society must be adapted to the general constitution of things, and cannot be
based upon exceptional cases.”); MONA DOMOSH & JONI SEAGER, PUTTING WOMEN IN PLACE:
FEMINIST GEOGRAPHERS MAKE SENSE OF THE WORLD (2001); Scott B. Astrada & Marvin L.
Astrada, Being Latino in the 21st Century: Reexamining Politicized Identity & the Problem of
Representation, 20 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 245 (2017).
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B. Politicized Identity, Political Community & Representation
The notion of an American political community based on
representation, despite distorted beginnings, is at the heart of American
democratic politics. Political community and representation are key to
American politics because of the role community norms, values, and other
ordering principles play in the articulation of public policy.53 Political
community is underpinned by politicized identities, plays a formative role
because it functions as: (1) a causal factor in the constitution of personal
identity; (2) a particular substantive value; and (3) a source of general,
metaethical value.54 In the American case, it may be more constructive to
view an American political community as being composed of various subcommunities that seek to generate and disseminate political identity-based
knowledge through formal politicized identity discourse. This is significant
because political knowledge answers the following question:
What is the meaning and purpose of this association? What is
the appropriate structure of our community and government?
Even if we assume that there are right answers to these last
questions . . . it is nevertheless the case that there will be as
many right answers as there are communities.55
It is certainly the case that identity is a key aspect of our political and
judicial systems. “Identity cannot exist without representation . . . .
Individuals can often communicate certain kinds of identity, such as race,
without conscious action. Other kinds of identity, such as religion, are
typically invisible. But even individuals with visible identities can
communicate consciously chosen messages of group pride and dissent.”56
It is an inescapable fact that the individual functions within the
context of groups—factions, as James Madison would have it—in the
American political system and legal process. “Representative government is a
process of accommodating group interests through democratic institutional
53

54
55
56

See Woodrow Wilson, Address at the Daughters of the American Revolution 25th Anniversary:
America First (Oct. 11, 1915), in AMERICA FIRST: PATRIOTIC READINGS 75, 76–77 (Jasper L. McBrien
ed., 1916), [https://archive.org/details/americafirst00mcbrrich]; George Washington, Farewell
Address (Sept. 19, 1796), in AMERICA FIRST, at 94, 96.
Mason, supra note 18, at 269.
Michael Walzer, Philosophy and Democracy, 9 POL. THEORY 379, 393 (1981).
Claims of equality based on identities of difference are intrinsically a kind of protest . .
. Identity claims in law arise not merely from a social context in which a particular
group shares a certain history, culture, or status. Underlying that kind of identity is a
shared viewpoint, not a set of opinions or a viewpoint specific to any particular topic or
issue, but ‘view-point’ in a more literal, basic sense: a shared point of view, a shared
position from which one's views emerge.
Nan D. Hunter, Expressive Identity: Recuperating Dissent for Equality, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 1, 5 (2000).
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arrangements . . . to insure effective representation . . . by a realistic
accommodation of the diverse and often conflicting political forces operating
within the State.”57 Accommodation has been a fundamental ordering
principle in the constitutional system. One major change observed in the
notion of representation is the shift from a historical focus on liberty to
equality and inclusion in the present.
Just as, in the earlier days of anarchy, the most thoughtful men
worshipped law, so during the period of increasing State power
there was a tendency to worship liberty . . . the impulse toward
liberty, however, seems now to have lost much of its force . . . it
has been replaced by the love of equality.58
This shift has noteworthy consequences for how identity-based politics and
factions manifest in thought and practice. Indeed, equality in the form of
inclusion—a driving force of identity-based factions—is in line with and has
facilitated the power of formal identity-based groups as opposed to a liberty
ethos focused on politics and policy.59 The consequential impact that formal
identity groups have on the political and legal process renders them, in
essence, identity-based factions, which thrive by priming or activating certain
identities in the electorate to support or reject specific policy agendas as well
as credit or discredit particular politicos or parties.60
Representation in both the political realm and legal process is quite
complex, especially in a nation of millions of people. It can be viewed in
different ways, such as in a universalist or pluralistic community-based
framework, which results in very distinctive paradigms for characterizing
representation.61 Representation in the United States is profoundly
57
58
59

60

61

Lucas v. Colo. Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 749 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
BERTRAND RUSSELL, AUTHORITY & THE INDIVIDUAL 29 (1949).
See Fredric Jameson, Foreword to JEAN FRANÇOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT
ON KNOWLEDGE, at vii, xiv–xvii (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., 1984); Paul Patton,
Introduction to JEAN BAUDRILLARD, THE GULF WAR DID NOT TAKE PLACE 1, 5–7 (Paul Patton trans.,
1995); Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 61–63 (1984); Damen
Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory &
Political Discourse, 29 CONN. L. REV. 561 (1997).
See Samara Klar, The Influence of Competing Identity Primes on Political Preferences, 75 J. POL.
1108, 1108–24 (2013).
For instance, regarding the relationship between representation, the rule of law, and its
application in society:
The liberal focus on the individual presupposes difference among citizens: because
individual ends are not homogeneous, they are incompatible with the existence of an
overarching common end. But the universalist assumption at the base of liberal thought
is that, because humans are identical in their status as moral beings, moral obligation
cannot be contingent on individual attributes, merits, or circumstances. The liberal
conception of the moral equality of persons requires that law have universal
application: it must treat all persons identically and disinterestedly, and its grant of
rights and liberties must extend to all persons in the polity.
Krug, supra note 31, at 1294.
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challenging given the diversity and difference that permeates the national
landscape. Difference permeates norms, values, morals, and other ideational
ordering mechanisms that enable a group or groups of people to effectively
cohere around a stable and universalizable set of ordering concepts and
principles, such as the rule of law. When it comes to politics, it is important to
keep in mind Bertrand Russell’s admonition:
[P]olitics, economics, and social organization generally, belong
in the realm of means, not ends. Our political and social
thinking is prone to what may be called the “administrator's
fallacy,” by which I mean the habit of looking upon society as a
systematic whole, of a sort that is thought good if it is pleasant
to contemplate as a model of order. . . . But a society does not,
or at least should not, exist to satisfy an external survey, but to
bring a good life to the individuals who compose it. It is in the
individuals, not in the whole, that ultimate value is to be
sought. A good society is a means to a good life for those who
compose it, not something having a separate kind if excellence
on its own account.62
Identity-based factions and formal politicized identity may or may not
be less than effective at keeping the aforementioned distinctions apart, due in
part to the existential trappings of articulating politics through the lens of
identity—the basis for one’s conception of Self, Other, and World.63 The
complex of principles, rules, ethos, and representative elite actors that
propagate, enforce, interpret, and apply them is essential to asserting the
propriety of an authoritative configuration of a politicized identity. Politicized
identity factions seem to bestride the divide between universal and
particularistic notions of political community. A universal interpretation of
an American political community may “have the effect of enforcing a singular
over a pluralist truth, that is, of reiterating the structure of the ideal
commonwealth in every previously particularist community . . . [and thereby
have the effect of] repressing internal political processes.”64 A pluralistic subcommunity’s view may also have the effect of propagating a “singular over a
pluralist truth”65 as far as the constitution of “authentic” identities and the
“correct” legal and political expression of identities in American politics.

62
63

64
65

RUSSELL, supra note 58, at 87.
See Louis Althusser, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Ben Brewster trans.), in NORTON
ANTHOLOGY, supra note 1, at 1285, 1292; see also MICHEL FOUCAULT, ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE
AND THE DISCOURSE ON LANGUAGE (A.M. Sheridan Smith trans., 1972); JEAN-FRANÇOIS LYOTARD &
JEAN-LOUP THÉBAUD, JUST GAMING, (Wlad Godzich trans., 1999); LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, CULTURE
& VALUE, (G.H. von Wright & Heikki Nyman eds., Peter Winch trans., 1980).
Walzer, supra note 55, at 393, 395.
JOHN RAWLS, 3 PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE II: CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS OF LEADING POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHERS 328 (Chandran Kukathas ed., 2003).
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Representation, in thought and practice, has been subject to critique as
an optimal or genuine state of affairs regarding the American political
process and system. For instance, it has been argued:
[T]he grounding of normative political theory in universalist
premises has been confronted by a recognition that the specific
needs of blacks, women, and homosexuals, among others,
cannot be addressed by the universalist principles of equal
individual rights and ostensibly equal opportunities. This
recognition of difference within the political community
necessitates consideration of the group. To the extent that
many individuals have been discriminated against or
subordinated because of their shared differences, individual
differences become group differences, which in turn usher in
the concept of group rights as a means of tempering liberal
universalism.66
It has also been contended that “[o]ur political system is unfair to ethnic,
political and other minorities. The system cannot provide representative
fairness because it is ‘winner take all’ and defective in its foundation. The
only solution is proportional representation, which will provide majority rule
and fair minority representation.”67 Representation is, or rather should be,
much more substantive than mere procedural processes or guarantees of “an
electoral system characterized by at-large elections in which the seats are
divided among parties and/or individuals in proportion to the number of votes
received by each.”68 Whether one subscribes to a procedural or a more
substantive view of representational politics, it seems to be the case that
no theory of representation is universally valid. Interests are
important and like-minded groups should be allowed to speak
as a unified voice. At the same time, we do not dare let those
interests govern completely . . . . The compromise [embedded in
the core value/norm of accommodation] recognizes the
difference in theories of representation, and it also recognizes
the presence of diverse interests . . . our need to accommodate
intensifies. Which interests shall be represented? . . . And which
theory of representation do we then embrace? One that
guarantees absolute equality of votes as measured by
population? One that proportions votes by ethnicity? By
geography? By occupation? Whatever the answer, it will . . .
66
67

68

Krug, supra note 31, at 1295.
Henry Sanders & Rose M. Sanders, Should the U.S. Constitution Be Amended to Require
Proportional Representation: Arguments For and Against, 5 N.Y. L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 345, 345
(1988).
John R. Low-Beer, The Constitutional Imperative of Proportional Representation, 94 YALE L.J. 163,
164 n.4 (1984) (characterizing proportional representation systems).
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Representation is part of an overarching system of law and politics,
institutional and ideational. Politicized identity and identity-based factions
influence representation systemically in that each functions as and in a
“system of knowledge” that establishes “an accepted grid for filtering”70
political thought and mobilization of subjects under the banner of an identitybased faction’s interpretation of what constitutes an identity and its interests
in policy spaces.71 Politicized identity and the positing of an American
political community are subject to the ebb and flow of the different goals
underpinning notions, or rather interpretations of political community—that
is, “between respecting and fostering the particular and diverse values of
different individual communities (whatever those values happen to be) on the
one hand, and fostering the (single) value of substantive community, on the
other.”72
Authority in the form of identarian-based elites plays a significant role
in manufacturing formal identity-based factions and helps create policy
spaces for subjects to dwell in as far as providing perceptive and cognitive
apparatuses to explain and understand the relationship between Self, Other,
and World.73 Authority and the discourse it promulgates are the result of
carefully selected, de-emphasized, marginalized, and included or excluded
facets of a politicized identity put forth by an identity-based faction—one
69

70
71

72
73

John Moeller, The Supreme Court's Quest for Fair Politics, 1 CONST. COMMENT. 203, 205 (1994).
Note that the Court, in articulating its equal protection jurisprudence, has explicitly privileged an
overarching American political value that is embedded in the socio-cultural superstructure of the
American political community, i.e., individualism. The “rights created by the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual. The rights established are
personal rights.” Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948); see also Oyama v. California, 332 U.S.
633, 663 (1948); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); McCabe v. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co., 235 U.S. 151, 161–62 (1914).
EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM 14 (1978).
[G]roup rights fail to be anti-essentialist because they implicitly affirm the essentialist
presumption that all persons of a particular race or gender share a common identity
outside the context of discrimination; the substantive approach to adjudication that
group rights imply likewise fails to be anti-essentialist because it too relies on a
conception of unified group identity. This implies that substantive jurisprudence fails
to be anti-universalist as well: like universal individual rights and rule-bound formal
jurisprudence, substantive jurisprudence screens out important aspects of substance,
context, and identity.
Krug, supra note 31, at 1292–93.
Mason, supra note 18, at 699.
There is nothing mysterious or natural about authority. It is formed, irradiated,
disseminated; it is instrumental, it is persuasive; it has status, it establishes canons of
taste and value; it is virtually indistinguishable from certain ideas it dignifies [and
signifies] as true, and from traditions, perceptions, and judgements it forms, transmits,
and reproduces . . . All these attributes of authority apply to [politicized identity].
SAID, supra note 70, at 19–20.
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which is promulgated by elite gatekeepers.74 “Every political judgment helps
to modify the facts on which it is passed. Political thought is itself a form of
political action.”75 Purpose is the condition of thought that gives rise to any
system of knowledge—it becomes fused with analysis to form a “single
process”76 of inquiry and understanding. Politicized identity-based factions,
therefore, create knowledge systems that, in turn, inform the political and
legal process underpinning policy spaces.
Representation, at a rudimentary level of analysis, in the U.S. political
system is based on accommodation.
This has been true in the United States at least since Madison
persuaded his fellow participants at the Constitutional
Convention that a large republic would be preferable to a small
one. Besides the ‘various and unequal distribution of property,’
individuals differ in their wants and needs, in their fortunes,
and in their opinions about religion and government. These
differences lead people to form groups—Madison calls them
factions—that seek their own gain at the expense of others.
Whether or not increasing the size of the republic solves the
problem, it does increase the number of groups and competing
interests, as well as the need for some kind of accommodation.77
A problem that emerges between representation and politicized identity is
that politics becomes susceptible to a high degree of ideological agitation that,
in turn, has the potential to negatively affect the public sphere within which
democratic discourse takes place.78 This state of affairs, however, may be
mitigated if politicized identity is viewed as a limited, functional, and
expedient means by which to communicate the pluralistic needs, interests,
and goals of a political sub-community that is integral to the nationalist
notion of an American political community. From a universalist perspective,
74

75
76
77

78

Social movements founded on identity politics generate claims based on shared identity
characteristics in order to gain access to public and private domains. In our political
life, identity politics is interwoven with dissent—is understood as dissent. Virtually all
of the American civil rights movements since World War II have embodied the harmony
between identity and dissent that exists in social practice, if not in law.
Hunter, supra note 56, at 1–2 (2000).
E.H. CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS CRISIS 5 (1964).
Id. at 4.
John Moeller, The Supreme Court's Quest for Fair Politics, 1 CONST. COMMENT. 203, 205 (1994); see
also THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (defining a faction as: “[A] number of citizens,
whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some
common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the
permanent and aggregate interests of the community”).
See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, IDENTITY: THE DEMAND FOR DIGNITY AND THE POLITICS OF RESENTMENT 116
(2018) (“[T]he preoccupation with identity has clashed with the need for deliberative discourse. The
focus on lived experience by identity groups valorizes inner selves experienced emotionally rather
than examined rationally.”).
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however, it may be the case that the public sphere does not effectively
accommodate debate in the true sense of the term when employing politicized
identity because politicized identity, at least on one extreme of the spectrum,
as the basis of politics, may have the effect of “stopping debate altogether.”79
From a universalist view of an American political community, the
potential of politicized identity to shut down and constrain public discourse
on policy can lead to the establishment of this/that binaries as far as correct
and incorrect modalities of expressing a group’s legal and political
perceptions of policy discourse and spaces. In the legal realm, the Court has
struggled with the dichotomy of singular versus multifarious views of
political community, seeming to borrow from one then the other or fusing the
two together in a confused effort to provide comprehensive and universal
legal definitions of an American political community.80 Take, for instance, the
Court’s reasoning regrading representation in the political process:
[R]epresentative government is in essence self-government
through the medium of elected representatives of the people,
and each and every citizen has an inalienable right to full and
effective participation in the political processes of his State's
legislative bodies. Most citizens can achieve this participation
only as qualified voters through the election of legislators to
represent them. Full and effective participation by all citizens
79

80

KRAUTHAMMER, supra note 30, at 142. “Universal approaches to equality are informed by a
movement away from identity groups as forming the baseline for anti-discrimination and equality
law. As such, all individuals, without reference to their identity, are guaranteed a set of rights,
benefits, or protections.” Osamudia R. James, Valuing Identity, 102 MINN. L. REV. 127, 164 (2017);
see also Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Preventing Balkanization or Facilitating Racial Domination: A
Critique of the New Equal Protection, 22 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1 (2015).
The difficulties with singular versus multifarious views of political community, individualism, and
the group is exemplified by the Court’s judgment and reasoning in Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435,
447 (1970) (holding that because a public park could not be operated on racially discriminatory
basis, the intention of testator who left property in trust for creating a public park for exclusive use
of white people could not be fulfilled and that the trust property therefore reverted to heirs of
testator, the Georgia court’s refusal to apply cy pres doctrine to override the testator’s will did not
violate Black citizens’ Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process). The
Court noted:
Petitioners also advance a number of considerations of public policy in opposition to the
conclusion which we have reached. In particular, they regret, as we do, the loss of the
Baconsfield trust to the City of Macon, and they are concerned lest we set a precedent
under which other charitable trusts will be terminated. It bears repeating that our
holding today reaffirms the traditional role of the States in determining whether or not
to apply their cy pres doctrines to particular trusts. Nothing we have said here prevents
a state court from applying its cy pres rule in a case where the Georgia court, for
example, might not apply its rule. More fundamentally, however, the loss of charitable
trusts such as Baconsfield is part of the price we pay for permitting deceased persons
to exercise a continuing control over assets owned by them at death. This aspect of
freedom of testation, like most things, has its advantages and disadvantages. The
responsibility of this Court, however, is to construe and enforce the Constitution and
laws of the land as they are and not to legislate social policy on the basis of our own
personal inclinations. (emphasis added).
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in state government requires, therefore, that each citizen have
an equally effective voice in the election of members of his state
legislature. Modern and viable state government needs, and the
Constitution demands, no less. . . . And the concept of equal
protection has been traditionally viewed as requiring the
uniform treatment of persons standing in the same relation to
the governmental action questioned or challenged.81
Despite attempts to provide inclusive and far-ranging legal and
constitutional criteria, American law and society continue to struggle with
implementing universalist-type pronouncements concerning the character
and content of the polity.82
81

82

Reynolds v. Sims 377 U.S. 533, 565–66 (1964). Yet, representation suffers from a severe deficit in
our historical and present politics. Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Utah v. Strieff discusses this
deficit in light of the criminal law:
[The] white defendant in this case shows that anyone’s dignity can be violated [by the
police]. But it is no secret that people of color are disproportionate victims of [heightened
police] scrutiny. For generations, black and brown parents have given their children
‘”he talk”—instructing them never to run down the street; always keep your hands
where they can be seen; do not even think of talking back to a stranger—all out of fear
of how an officer with a gun will react to them. By legitimizing the conduct that
produces this double consciousness, this case tells everyone, white and black, guilty and
innocent, that an officer can verify your legal status at any time. It says that your body
is subject to invasion while courts excuse the violation of your rights. It implies that
you are not a citizen of a democracy but the subject of a carceral state, just waiting to
be cataloged. We must not pretend that the countless people who are routinely targeted
by police are “isolated.” They are the canaries in the coal mine whose deaths, civil and
literal, warn us that no one can breathe in this atmosphere. They are the ones who
recognize that unlawful police stops corrode all our civil liberties and threaten all our
lives. Until their voices matter too, our justice system will continue to be anything but.
136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070–71 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
The Court has declared that it “is confronted with the task of reconciling conflicting rights of the
diverse communities within our society and of individuals.” Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S.
184, 200–01 (1964). In Boddie v. Connecticut, the Court reasoned:
Perhaps no characteristic of an organized and cohesive society is more fundamental
than its erection and enforcement of a system of rules defining the various rights and
duties of its members, enabling them to govern their affairs and definitively settle their
differences in an orderly, predictable manner. Without such a “legal system,” social
organization and cohesion are virtually impossible; with the ability to seek regularized
resolution of conflicts individuals are capable of interdependent action that enables
them to strive for achievements without the anxieties that would beset them in a
disorganized society. Put more succinctly, it is this injection of the rule of law that
allows society to reap the benefits of rejecting what political theorists call the “state of
nature.” American society, of course, bottoms its systematic definition of individual
rights and duties, as well as its machinery for dispute settlement, not on custom or the
will of strategically placed individuals, but on the common-law model. It is to courts, or
other quasi-judicial official bodies, that we ultimately look for the implementation of a
regularized, orderly process of dispute settlement. Within this framework, those who
wrote our original Constitution, in the Fifth Amendment, and later those who drafted
the Fourteenth Amendment recognized the centrality of the concept of due process in
the operation of this system. Without this guarantee that one may not be deprived of
his rights, neither liberty nor property, without due process of law, the State's monopoly
over techniques for binding conflict resolution could hardly be said to be acceptable
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Language can be rendered strictly binary depending on how one
interprets and defines an overarching political community. Identity is subject
to being restricted in political and legal discourse, while also retaining an
expansive character or potential in the realm of socio-cultural discourse,
depending on one’s characterization of what constitutes an American political
community in representative policy spaces.83 A rigid binary framework of
inclusion and exclusion based on universal criteria posited by elites at the
helm of identity-based factions can generate rigid opposition to policy
postures. Differing iterations of identity thereby proliferate in the public
sphere of discourse and representational politics.
III. PAST & PRESENT: THE ENDURING PROBLEM OF IDENTITY-BASED
REPRESENTATION
A politicized identity-framework informed the framing and subsequent
interpretation of the Constitution from the founding onward. As noted by the
Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, for instance, African Blacks were signaled out for
less-than-legal personhood in the establishment of an American political
community embodied in the founding Constitutional order:

83

under our scheme of things. Only by providing that the social enforcement mechanism
must function strictly within these bounds can we hope to maintain an ordered society
that is also just.
401 U.S. 371, 374–75 (1971).
John Stuart Mill prefigured this issue:
A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a Nationality if they are united among
themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and any others—
which make them co-operate with each other more willingly than with other people,
desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be government by
themselves or a portion of themselves exclusively. This feeling of nationality may have
been generated by various causes. Sometimes it is the effect of identity of race and
descent. Community of language, and community of religion, greatly contribute to it.
Geographical limits are one of its causes. But the strongest of all is identity of political
antecedents; the possession of a national history, and consequent community of
recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the
same incidents in the past. None of these circumstances, however, are either
indispensable, or necessarily sufficient by themselves.
JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 308 (Henry Holt 1873)
(1861).
To render a federation advisable, several conditions are necessary. The first is, that
there should be a sufficient amount of mutual sympathy among the populations. The
federation binds them always to fight on the same side; and if they have such feelings
towards one another, or such diversity of feeling towards their neighbours [sic], that
they would generally prefer to fight on opposite sides, the federal tie is neither likely to
be of long duration, not to be well observed while it subsists. The sympathies available
for the purpose are those of race, language, religion, and, above all, of political
institutions, as conducing most to a feeling of identity of political interest.
Id. at 320; see also Lyle Denniston, The Past and Future of America’s Political Community, NAT’L
CONST. CTR.: CONST. DAILY (July 25, 2019), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/the-past-and-futureof-americas-political-community.
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The object of the [Fourteenth] amendment was undoubtedly to
enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law,
but in the nature of things it could not have been intended to
abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as
distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the
two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.84
Critics of the Constitution at the founding, such as Patrick Henry and
George Mason, contended that a truly representative republic could not
function properly on the scale envisioned by the Constitution. Indeed, the
multi-hued diversity of people, interests, and values of the population were
simply too complex to capture in the identarian representational schema
proffered by the Constitution.85
Although renowned twentieth-century “sociologists such as Robert
Park and Talcott Parsons predicted evolutionary progress in ethnic relations
toward assimilation or inclusion of various groups within American society,
nothing [in the present] indicates that such developments are at hand.”86 The
issue of scale, which has burgeoned in a manner that could not have been
envisioned by the founding generation, in conjunction with the notion that
the sundry interests attached to identities “don’t stand still[,] . . . [t]hey
evolve,”87 arguably remains a salient problem for the operation of a genuine
representational democratic political system. At the time of the founding,
George Mason thought that in the “House of Representatives sixty-five men
would presume to reflect the interests of all the diverse states . . . . Mason
reasoned, ‘there is not the Substance, but the Shadow of Representation.’”88
Mason’s critique of the Constitution suffering from representational
deficiency in the fundamental law has been transpiring for over two centuries
as far as clarifying how political identities are expressed and perpetuated in
the fundamental law and ordering of the polity.89 This deficiency, in part, can
84
85

86
87
88
89

163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896).
See, e.g., LORRI GLOVER, THE FATE OF THE REVOLUTION: VIRGINIANS DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION 16–17
(2016).
Christopher E. Smith, The Supreme Court and Ethnicity, 69 OR. L. REV. 797, 812 (1990).
KRAUTHAMMER, supra note 30, at 170.
GLOVER, supra note 85, at 25.
See generally CHARLES BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (1918)
(contending that the structure of the U.S. Constitution was motivated primarily by the personal
financial interests of the Founders, a cohesive economic elite sector that sought to protect the elite
minority from the mass majority regarding private property and wealth); see also Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding that the fundamental right to marry is guaranteed to samesex couples by both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (finding
that a state denies black defendants equal protection when members of his/her race have been
purposefully excluded from a jury); Regents of the Univ. of. Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)
(holding that a public university may take race into account as a factor in admissions decisions);
Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (finding that a city school system’s failure to provide English
language instruction to students of Chinese ancestry was unlawful discrimination); Jones v. Alfred
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be traced to an underlying tensions and emergent contradictions that
undergird the articulation and expression of the relationship between the
individual and the group vis-à-vis politicized identarian classifications.90
Race,91 ethnicity,92 voting,93 political and ideological affiliation,94 and
sexuality95 constitute some of the legal and political fronts on which
contestation over formal political identities and the proper ordering of society
and community has been waged. At the founding, for instance, although not
formally expressed as such, the political identity that was instrumental in
“Constitution making was under the exclusive purview of property-owning
white men because suffrage was strictly limited.”96 Madison, along with
others during the founding, viewed the Constitutional order as an
“enlightened natural aristocracy” that would effectively check and balance
the People to avoid what was deemed “bad politics,” such as equal division of
property.97 The People, the American political community, would thus be
subject to multiple layers of controls that would effectively divest the energy
that mobilized people to support “improper” policy initiatives, rendering the
People passive recipients of enlightened rule. In Madison’s initial view of
democracy, representation was to be considerably tempered in order to divest
of force the People’s passions, desires, and interests so as to make the

90

91

92

93

94

95

96
97

H. Mayer Co. 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (holding that federal law bars all racial discrimination (private
or public) in the sale or rental of property); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that state
laws prohibiting inter-racial marriage are unconstitutional); Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31
(1962) (prohibiting racial segregation of interstate and intrastate transportation facilities); Brown
v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (prohibiting racial segregation of public
schools).
See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, NOT ONLY FOR MYSELF: IDENTITY, POLITICS, AND THE LAW, 40–1 (1997)
(“[C]onflicts among self-identification, internal group membership practices, and external,
oppressive assignments have given rise to . . . inconsistent meanings of group membership.”).
See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (finding that the categorical exclusion of blacks
from juries for no other reason than their race violated the Equal Protection Clause).
See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (finding that exclusion of otherwise eligible persons
from jury service solely because of their ancestry or national origin is violates the Fourteenth
Amendment).
See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (finding that the Equal Protection Clause requires
substantially equal legislative representation for all citizens in a State regardless of where they
reside).
See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (finding that the State cannot deprive people of the
right of free association, even in the interests of national security).
See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding a state law criminalizing sodomy),
overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down a state sodomy law, rendering
same-sex sexual activity constitutionally protected).
GLOVER, supra note 85, at 27.
Id. at 25–30; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison); Adam M.
Carrington, ‘Natural Aristocracy’ and the U.S. Constitution, NAT’L REV. (Oct. 27, 2017),
https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/10/united-states-constiuttion-declaration-independencefounders-framers-natural-aristocracy-democracy-republicanism/.
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populace amenable to a stable and orderly politics.98 Politicized identity
proved a viable and significant means by which to enforce the “enlightened
natural aristocracy.”
A complicating factor in articulating representation and its evolution
through space and time is that of politicized identity. The Founders shared
and perpetuated their distinctive identities—political, ideological, and socioeconomic identity-based factions—by embedding said identities into the
fundamental law, the Constitutional text and ethos that undergird any
permutations or iterations of an American political community. The racial
and class-based nature of the Founders’ overall identities and experience
informed the politicized identity which found, and continues to find,
expression in the Constitutional framework. The Constitutional order, as
initially conceived and into the present, is one that was and that continues to
be interpreted from a politicized identity perspective. During the founding, it
was between federalists and confederationist factions, for instance, and in the
present, we find that representation, broadly conceived, remains the province
of an elite (which the confederationists feared) that define the contours and
parameters of what constitutes representation in the legal and political
process governed by the fundamental law embodied in the Constitution.
Elites in the political and legal process continue to deploy identity to
perpetuate particular, suitable interpretations of identity in public
discourse.99
In the case of law, we can view the foregoing in the Court’s
jurisprudence when it comes to gerrymandering, voting, civil rights, housing,
and other realms of ordering society that are affected by how the Court
interprets representation. This is especially the case when seeking to locate
the source and scope of State power under the Constitution. Early in its
history, the Court privileged a nationalist interpretation of the Constitution
over a local/regional state-based approach to representation. In McCulloch v.
Maryland,100 the Court declared that “government proceeds directly from the
people; is ‘ordained and established,’ in the name of the people; and is
declared to be ordained, ‘in order to form a more perfect union, establish
justice, insure domestic tranquility, and secure the blessings of liberty to
themselves and to their posterity.’” The Court embedded its political,
normative, ideological, and socio-economic worldview—based on the
politicized identity of Chief Justice Marshall—who viewed federal power as

98

99

100

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); Jeffrey Rosen, America Is Living James Madison’s
Nightmare, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/10/jamesmadison-mob-rule/568351/.
See, e.g., Sanjana Karanth & Nick Visser, Joe Biden Refuses to Apologize for Comments on
Segregationists, HUFFINGTON POST (June 19, 2019, 9:29 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/joebiden-refuse-apologize-segregationist_n_5d0adccfe4b09f5a54b5e266.
17 U.S. 316, 403–04 (1819).
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emanating from “We the People” not “We the States.”101 In Chisholm v.
Georgia, the Court asserted:
To the Constitution of the United States the term Sovereign, is
totally unknown. There is but one place where it could have
been used with propriety. But, even in that place it would not
have comported with the delicacy of those, who ordained and
established that Constitution. They might have announced
themselves ‘Sovereign people’ of the United States: But
serenely conscious of that fact, they avoided the ostentatious
declaration.102
A fundamental problem considered immanent in the Constitutional
order set forth at the founding was that “as vast a territory as the United
States could never be governed as a single republic.”103 Identity-based
factions are in the sociocultural and political DNA of American politics, law,
and society. Indeed, identity-based factions—Federalist/Anti-federalist,
Property Holder/Non-Property Holder, Federal/State, and North/South—were
key players in defining, implementing, and interpreting the Constitution.
Formal political identity, expressed in the guise of regional interests and
identities, would be a weighty factor in the dissolution of the Union.104
During ratification, Judge Harry Innes asserted: “Our interests [as Southern
States] and the interests of the Eastern States are so diametrically opposite
to each other that there cannot be ray of hope left to the Western Country to
suppose that when once that interest clashes we shall have justice done
us.”105

101

102

103
104

105

Louise Weinberg, Of Sovereignty and the Union: The Legends of Alden, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1113, 1150 (2001); see also Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Fourteenth Amendment's Constitution, 69
S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 66 (1995) (“Marshall treated the American people as a single entity incapable of
making a binding agreement with itself.”).
2 U.S. 419, 454 (1793); see also Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 324 (1816) (“The
constitution of the United States was ordained and established, not by the states in their sovereign
capacities, but emphatically, as the preamble of the constitution declares, by ‘the people of the
United States.’”).
GLOVER, supra note 85, at 28.
See Lori Robinson, Region and Race: National Identity and the Southern Past, in A COMPANION TO
THE REGIONAL LITERATURES OF AMERICA 57 (Charles L. Crow ed., 2003); Anthony Daniel Perez &
Charles Hirschman, The Changing Racial and Ethnic Composition of the US Population: Emerging
American Identities, 35 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 1 (2009).
Harry Innes to John Brown (Feb. 20, 1788), in 16 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION: COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, VOLUME 4, 1
FEBRUARY TO 31 MARCH 1788, at 152, 152–53 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1986).
Innes himself was a fascinating figure for the purposes of considering politicized identity. A
staunch supporter of Kentucky’s independence from Virginia and an Anti-Federalist opponent of
ratification, he was also a close ally of George Washington and served as a federal judge from the
founding until his death in 1816. – Ed. See generally MARY K. BONSTEEL TACHAU, FEDERAL COURTS
IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: KENTUCKY, 1789–1816, at 31–53 (1978).
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The complexity and problems of identity being interspersed in the
formative period of the Constitutional order is also reflected in the power
binary between state and national governments. For instance, in opposition
to the federalists during the Virginia Constitutional debates, Patrick Henry
declared: “‘What right had they to say, We, the People[,] . . . States are the
Characteristics, and the soul of a confederation.’ The framers, Henry
believed, had destroyed the sovereign states and created ‘one great
consolidated National Government.’”106 Furthermore, George Mason “insisted
that sixty-five representatives ‘cannot possibly know the situation and
circumstances of all the inhabitants of this immense continent. It would . . .
be impossible to have a full and adequate representation in the General
Government; it would be too . . . unwieldy.’”107 For Mason, locally-based
representation, group, and ideological identity should have controlled, not a
unitary and politicized notion of “We the People.” During the Virginia
constitutional debates, he reflected on “traditional, localistic ideas about
representation. Representatives . . .‘ought to mix with the People, think as
they think, feel as they feel, ought to be perfectly amenable to them, and
thoroughly acquainted with their interest and condition.’”108
In light of the foregoing contextualization of the impact that politicized
identity has had since the founding, it is important, when attempting to map
out the contemporary terrain of politics, to grasp the relationship between
representation and identity-based factions. This enables a critical awareness
of the effects political identity has on politics when it is the principal form of
organizing political platforms and articulating public policy. Representation
remains a key ordering concept that continues to transect the political and
legal process, constitutional order, and the legal actuality that emanates from
the Court’s interpretation of representation and notions of an American
political community. In the context of legislative apportionment, for instance,
which directly impacts the form and substance of representation, the Court
has noted that “fair and effective representation for all citizens” is a basic
component of—and helps ensure the operation of—a genuinely
representational political system.109 In light of recent social-scientific
research on group psychology, some commentators contend that, in light of
representational politics, “heterogeneous groups make better collective
judgments than homogenous groups.”110
Politicized identity, as expressed in policy, politics, and law, is a
discursive construct that is endowed with plasticity due to its cultural,
106
107
108
109
110

GLOVER, supra note 85, at 105.
Id. at 107.
Id.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).
Carla D. Pratt, Judging Identity, 2016 REVISTA FORUMUL JUDECĂTORILOR 84, 86 (2016) (citing
Katherine W. Phillips, Katie A. Liljenquist & Margaret A. Neale, Is the Pain Worth the Gain? The
Advantages and Liabilities of Agreeing with Socially Distinct Newcomers, 35 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 336, 345–47 (2009)).
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ideological, and political nature. Identity discourse provides, or rather
attempts to provide, some form of bright-line boundaries for advocacy and
inclusion/exclusion. This dynamic directly impacts the limits of “correct”
thought and conduct and the proper conception and articulation of interests
and goals in the realm of public policy. In the case of those politicians seeking
the Democratic nomination to run against President Trump in 2020,
politicized identity is at the forefront of who is encouraged, predicted,
allowed, or favored to secure the nomination.111 The foregoing is an example
of how, within a discourse of politicized identity, one is subject to a
“relationship of power, of domination, of varying degrees of complex
hegemony.”112
Identity-based factions produce a discourse that helps constitute the
parameters and contours of politics. This produces a base of critique and
knowledge that centers around select limited concepts, and systemically and
systematically perpetuates the discourse of “correctness” that emanates from
the exercise of power to posit a politicized identity. This is important to note
because concepts can be analogized to analytic nets placed over the cognitive
and perceptive frameworks employed by a subject to navigate politics and
society. That is,
different nets correspond to different systems for describing the
world. Mechanics determines one form of description of the
world by saying that all propositions used in the description of
the world must be obtained in a given way from a given set of
propositions—the axioms of mechanics. It thus supplies the
bricks for building the edifice of [knowledge], and it says, “Any
building that you want to erect, whatever it may be, must
somehow be constructed with these bricks, and these alone.”113
IV. LAW, POLITICS, IDENTITY & REPRESENTATION
Law is the means by which policy is effectuated. The law is part of a
biopolitics in which power is exercised in a manner that can be characterized
as the “power of regulation” to regularize life, which “consists in making live .
111

112
113

See Rich Barlow, Democrats Shouldn’t Rule Out Candidates Because of Race or Gender — That
Includes White Men, WBUR COGNOSCENTI (Jan. 10, 2019),
https://www.wbur.org/cognoscenti/2019/01/10/democratic-presidential-nominee-2020-rich-barlow
(“[O]bsessing over identity rather than the content of character both ignores Martin Luther King,
Jr.’s counsel and flirts with political fire.”); see also Jamelle Bouie, Democrats Have Made One
Thing Very Clear About 2020: They’re Over White Men: Or, Why Kamala Harris Looks Like a Likely
Nominee, SLATE (Nov. 15, 2018), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/11/democraticpresidential-candidates-2020-diversity-white-men.html.
SAID, supra note 70, at 1787.
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS 68 (D. F. Pears & B.F. McGuinness
trans., Routledge 1975).
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. . the right to intervene to make live . . . [and] eliminating . . . deficiencies.”114
The “regularization of life,” as Michel Foucault terms it, in the context of
biopower and politics, is one that excludes, reduces, and emplaces thought
and being in binary oppositions within which complexity, diversity, and the
morass of human beings are simplified in the name of a pragmatic politics,
which in turn, serves a narrowly defined identity for the purposes of wielding
power in politics and policy.115 Complex notions of representation are
attenuated.116 Politicized identity is thus part of the “biosocial or biological
processes characteristic of human masses.”117
When considering the law’s rule-based mandate to procure order, it is
interesting to note how law seeks to regularize life and administer identity as
articulated by elites in the service of effectuating policy agendas, which are
notions of an American political community. Fixing identity in space and
time for the explicit purpose of political mobilization, organization, and as the
conceptual basis for applied representation and public policy, may suffer from
what Chief Justice Roger Traynor observed in Pacific Gas & Electric v. G.W.
Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co.,118 where he addressed the difficulty in
assigning a singular meaning to a particular word; an observation readily
applied to the inherent problem in attempting to fix identity designations:
If words had absolute and constant references, it might be
possible to discover . . . intention in the words themselves and
in the manner in which they were arranged. Words, however,
114

115

116

117
118

Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, in NORTON ANTHOLOGY, supra note 1, at 1445. In terms
of identity and the law, the Court has found that identity is key in various areas of societal affairs
and requires special attention in some form or other. For example, in United States v. BrignoniPonce, a unanimous Court found that it was a violation of the Fourth Amendment for a roving
patrol car to stop a vehicle solely on the basis of the driver appearing to be of Mexican descent. 422
U.S. 873 (1975).
See MICHEL FOUCAULT, “SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED”: LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE, 1975–
1976, at 247–49 (Mauro Bertani & Alessandro Fontana eds., David Macey trans., 2003).
In the instant case, the impact of the Massachusetts statute on women is undisputed.
Any veteran with a passing grade on the civil service exam must be placed ahead of a
nonveteran, regardless of their respective scores. The District Court found that, as a
practical matter, this preference supplants test results as the determinant of upper
level civil service appointments. Because less than 2% of the women in Massachusetts
are veterans, the absolute-preference formula has rendered desirable state civil service
employment an almost exclusively male prerogative. As the District Court recognized,
this consequence follows foreseeably, indeed inexorably, from the long history of policies
severely limiting women’s participation in the military. Although neutral in form, the
statute is anything but neutral in application. It inescapably reserves a major sector of
public employment to “an already established class which, as a matter of historical fact,
is 98% male.” Where the foreseeable impact of a facially neutral policy is so
disproportionate, the burden should rest on the State to establish that sex-based
considerations played no part in the choice of the particular legislative scheme.
See, e.g., Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 283–84 (1979).
Foucault, supra note 114, at 1447.
442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968).
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do not have absolute and constant referents. . . . The meaning
of particular words or groups of words varies with the . . . verbal
context and surrounding circumstances and purposes in view of
the linguistic education and experience of their users and their
hearers or readers (not excluding judges). . . . A word has no
meaning apart from these factors; much less does it have an
objective meaning, one true meaning.119
Judge O. Rogeriee Thompson’s dissent in Kosilek v. Spencer120
illuminates Justice Traynor’s observation of the problem in capturing and
perpetuating identity. Judge Thompson notes that the majority opinion
reifies the gender binary of male/female to deny benefits to a transgender
inmate, and that it “aggrieves an already marginalized community, and
enables correctional systems to further postpone their adjustment to the
crumbling gender binary.”121 This identity-based binary is the basis of law,
which informs and organizes
our daily interactions, our values, our social institutions . . . our
very understanding of reality, around these assumptions. One
is not fully cognizable as human without a designation as male
or female. The categories of sex and gender and the differences
we ascribe to them are legitimized through naturalizing them,
insisting that they are based on real, inevitable differences and
thus go unquestioned . . . this binary system[, however,] is not
natural, but socially and politically constructed.122
It is important to note that, irrespective of where one is situated on
the formal ideological spectrum, attempting to suspend identity-based
classifications in space and time seems to have the effect of emplacing
subjects in essentialized identity templates that ossify, perpetuate stasis, and
are not able to transcend the historical moment in which said identity-based
classifications were articulated and implemented in the legal and political
process and policy spaces.
Politicized identity, while imbricated in policy, generally speaking, has
distinct impacts on policy when it is employed to mobilize, organize, define,
and posit distinctive identity groups’ interests on the political stage.
Politicized identity leaves an imprimatur on policy because:
Policy making functions on several different planes as it reflects
values, goals, interests, politics, history, and culture. At the
119
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Id. at 644–45 (quoting Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule,
50 CORNELL L.Q. 161, 187 (1965)).
Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 96 (1st Cir. 2014) (Rogeriee Thompson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 113 (Rogeriee Thompson, J., dissenting).
Tara Dunnavant, Note, Bye-Bye Binary: Transgender Prisoners and the Regulation of Gender in the
Law, 9 FED. CTS. L. REV. 15, 20 (2016).

50

Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality

[8:19

same time . . . policy reflects the purpose and meaning of being
a member of a political unit and forming a political identity. As
such, public policy is not “the rules of governance for our
society” but [rather it is] the ambience within which those rules
are to be made.123
Politicized identity thus has a very broad impact on law, politics, and policy
beyond the sociopolitical and ideological agendas of identity-based factions
and the individual subjects that perpetuate and reside within formal
identarian classifications.
Law is a producer and product of knowledge. Legal process and
discourse inform the administration of justice and ostensibly safeguard
American norms and values, such as the rule of law, separation of powers,
checks and balances, and due process—each of which has weighty
implications for the actuality of subjects that reside within the law’s
jurisdiction. “Policymaking embodies identity formation while it preserves,
enhances, or augments the power to classify and define legal and political
actuality. As the structural ambience that anchors the constitutional order,
policy making also dismantles identity as it re-configures social functions and
redefines social welfare.”124
Law is fraught with complexity and contradictions. Attempts to
integrate formal politicized identity into law can create additional problems
for representative politics because of politicized identity’s capacity to cabin
the scope or circumference of representation.125 From a universalist lens, the
reductivist nature of politicized identity, which has the effect of seriously
simplifying the diverse and complex intersectionality of competing identities
to a singular, palpable identity for public and political consumption, shrinks
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Marvin L. Astrada, The Nature of the Judicial Process: A Complex Systems Analysis of Checks &
Balances & Separation of Powers in the Present Political Context, 21 RICH. PUB. INT. L. REV. 263,
278 (2017), https://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol21/iss3/4. For a discussion on how politics
affects and effects law and policy, see Bradley W. Joondeph, The Many Meanings of "Politics" in
Judicial Decision Making, 77 UMKC L. REV. 347, 348 (2008),
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/35 (“[P]olitics is generally understood as the fight over
whose views and values should prevail in the allocation of scarce societal resources, the struggle
over who receives various social benefits and who bears the costs.”).
Astrada, supra note 123, at 279; see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310
(2010) (holding political campaign contributions by corporations and labor unions constitute speech
protected by the Constitution); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding unconstitutional laws
that restrict a woman’s right to an abortion prior to fetal viability); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966) (holding police must advise criminal suspects of their rights under the Constitution to
remain silent, consult an attorney, and have legal representation appointed if indigent); Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding segregating schools by race violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (holding that
trying a defendant particular race or ethnicity in front of a jury where all persons of his race or
ethnicity have been excluded by the state violates of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding courts may not enforce restrictive
racial covenants for real estate).
See MARK LILLA, THE ONCE AND FUTURE LIBERAL: AFTER IDENTITY POLITICS 71–72 (2017).
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the space of representation vis-à-vis the public sphere in which policy is
articulated and implemented. As Madison notes:
[L]aws, though penned with the greatest technical skill, and
passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are
considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their
meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular
discussions and adjudications. Besides the obscurity arising
from the complexity of objects, and the imperfection of the
human faculties, the medium through which the conceptions of
men are conveyed to each other adds a fresh embarrassment.
The use of words is to express ideas. Perspicuity, therefore,
requires not only that the ideas should be distinctly formed, but
that they should be expressed by words distinctly and
exclusively appropriate to them. But no language is so copious
as to supply words and phrases for every complex idea, or so
correct as not to include many equivocally denoting different
ideas. Hence it must happen that however accurately objects
may be discriminated in themselves, and however accurately
the discrimination may be considered, the definition of them
may be rendered inaccurate by the inaccuracy of the terms in
which it is delivered.126
A pluralistic sub-community view of an American political community
finds strength in heterogeneity and expansive notions of national community.
A more restrictive universalist perspective, on the other hand, views law’s
relationship to fair and effective representation as being complicated by
politicized identity when it is the primary mechanism for effectuating policy.
This is the case because the latter comprehends society as constituted by “so
many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination
of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable . . . society
itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens.”127
The “political thicket”128 of politicized identity has the potential to exacerbate
the erosion of the overarching political system’s representative capacity. As a
form of knowledge and practice, law is subject to the same limitations as
social-scientific knowledge: “knowledge falls into a complex, conflict-filled
social environment, inhabited by agents with different interests and
motivations . . . ‘sheer knowledge alone, or “disinterested search for truth,”
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THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison).
OXFORD UNIV. PRESS, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 317
(Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005). See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (The Court should abstain “from political entanglements and by
abstention from injecting itself into the clash of political forces in political settlements.”).
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will never be determinative.’”129 Due to the “open-textured nature of law,”130
identity politics and politicized identity—when viewed as either constituting
a homogenous American political community or one constituted by sub-sets of
identity-based communities—can have a substantial impact on contouring
the representative space of groups or subjects.131
The Court has expressed various opinions about the relationship
between politicized identity and representation and has articulated sundry
legal tests and principles in developing its interpretation of representation,
and by default, the character and content of the American political
community.132 This is significant for any analysis of politicized identity
because of the implications Court decisions have for defining the character
and content of an American political community.133 In Shaw v. Reno, for
instance, the Court noted, regarding challenges to a redistricting plan:
[B]y perpetuating stereotypical notions about members of the
same racial group—that they think alike, share the same
political interests, and prefer the same candidates—a racial
gerrymander may exacerbate the very patterns of racial bloc
voting that majority-minority districting is sometimes said to
counteract. It also sends to elected representatives the message
that their primary obligation is to represent only that group’s
members rather than their constituency as a whole.134
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SCHNEIDER, supra note 29, at 211.
Joondeph, supra note 123, at 358.
See, e.g., Parents Involved v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (“[T]he way ‘to
achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis’ is to stop
assigning students on a racial basis. The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race.”).
Consider that the “Supreme Court has (especially when invoking the fourteenth amendment)
advanced such causes as a constitutionalized right to abortion on demand, a constitutionalized
leniency toward pornography, constitutionalized racial quotas, constitutionalized judicial
supervision of state school curricula, and a constitutionalized proscription of voluntary,
nondenominational public school prayer.” George Steven Swan, The Political Economy of Supreme
Court Social Policymaking 1987, 8 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 87, 88 (1989).
[Judicial] decisions throughout American history have generally reflected the nation's
prevailing social and political mores. The Supreme Court held that racial segregation
comported with the Fourteenth Amendment in 1896, but that it was unconstitutional
in 1954. It held that states could criminalize sodomy between consenting adults in 1986,
but that such laws were impermissible in 2003. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). On neither issue had the relevant
sources of legal authority changed. But on both issues, societal attitudes had evolved
significantly, growing less tolerant of racial segregation and more tolerant of
homosexuality.
Joondeph, supra note 123, at 365–66.
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 631 (1993).
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The Court has found that politicized identity is most viable when an
identity-based group is found to be “politically cohesive.”135 From a
universalist lens of political community, identity-based factional elites and
entrepreneurs may thus be incentivized to “find” or manufacture consent, so
to speak, as to what constitutes a discrete and insular cohesive identity that
will, in turn, find expression and protection under the law that may be at
odds with the actualities that undergird a political community. Cohesiveness,
however, must appear organic or at the very least not “forced.” When probing
the relationship between politicized identity and law, the Court, in Bush v.
Vera, for example, stated that legislative decisions that focus primarily on
race in redistricting “cause constitutional harm insofar as they convey the
message that political identity is, or should be, predominantly racial.”136 Yet,
from a pluralistic sub-communities perspective, an identity-based faction is
part and parcel constitutive of an American community, as sub-communities
are facets, components of a mosaic rather than a universal template
underpinning an American political community.
Due to the potential for putting forth a politicized identity that may be
artificially cohesive, politicized identity may further complicate an already
knotty state of affairs in the realm of law and representation. Within the
context of law and public policy, politics has been described as constituting
the following characteristics: “(1) politics accommodates competing interests;
(2) politics is empirical; (3) politics is inspired by an underlying moral
foundation; and (4) politics is an ongoing conversation.”137 Each of these
components or dimensions of politics can be employed to describe
representational politics. “The accommodation of interests and principles
emerges from an ongoing conversation. Accommodations never are final or
complete. They may receive all of the attention and study, but it is the
accommodating—the ongoing conversation—that does all of the work.”138
Based on one’s perspective of what is or what should constitute American
political community and representative political spaces, politicized identity
may prima facie negatively impact characteristics one and four and may do
little to buttress or enhance three.
In the case of representational politics, accommodation seems to be a
core norm-ordering principle: “The business of politics is not with theory and
ideology but with accommodation.”139 Identity-based factions can be viewed
as espousing, in essence, a monopoly over the definition, goals, interests, and
articulation of identity, politicizing it in order to promulgate a particular
interpretation of a group’s goals and interests in policy spaces. This dynamic,
to some degree, cuts against the foundational value and norm of
135
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See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 (1986).
517 U.S. 952, 980 (1996).
Moeller, supra note 77, at 204.
Id. at 207.
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 19 (1975).
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accommodation. For those that espouse a “correct” or singular interpretation
of an identity’s form and substance, the problem becomes that claims to
positing an identity in policy spaces can render an identity rigid or static:
[N]o group or interest can legitimately claim an absolute right
to any position. Not only are absolute claims fraught with
dangerous consequences . . . but absolute rights do not exist.
Rights are real only when and because society grants them.
Thus, one can argue persuasively that society should grant the
right to vote or the right to decent health care, but they become
rights only when the society’s accommodation affirms them as
rights.140
Whether one subscribes to or employs a universalist or the more
nuanced pluralistic sub-communities framework in the political and legal
process, a political faction—homogenous in nature or comprised of
heterogenous components and subcomponents—was originally acknowledged
as attenuating the representative capacity of a democratic political system in
The Federalist.141 In the case of identity-based factions employing politicized
identity in policy spaces, a modern interpretation of faction—one that is
united, actuated by a common impulse, passion or interest—can have a
potentially negative impact on representational politics. This is the case
because: (1) the elite that articulate the identity may not in actuality
represent the interests of group members and sub groups in the community;
or (2) the interest being proffered by elites that “speak” for the group may
reflect the priorities of the elite rather than that of the groups and
individuals that are being spoken for in policy spaces. A formal identity
faction may thus be less representative of a group’s actualities and interests,
occluding alternative interpretations of what constitutes an identity and its
representation in policy.
Policy is the expression of correct modalities that order and represent a
political community. “Every community has an ethical environment, and that
environment makes a difference to the lives its members can lead.”142 The
essence of a political community’s identity, distinct from the individuals or
groups and subgroups that constitute and reside within a polity, is embodied
in national policy spaces, for example, judicial opinions, which are products
and producers of the legal and political process that underpin a polity.143 The
Court has faced some of the problems that emerge from this state of affairs:
At the heart of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection
lies the simple command that the Government must treat
140
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Moeller, supra note 77, at 204–05.
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 479, 480 (1989).
See Stephen M. Feldman, The Supreme Court in a Postmodern World: A Flying Elephant, 84 MINN.
L. REV. 673 (2000).
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citizens “as individuals, not ‘as simply components of a racial,
religious, sexual or national class.’” Social scientists may debate
how people’s thoughts and behavior reflect their background,
but the Constitution provides that the Government may not
allocate benefits and burdens among individuals based on the
assumption that race or ethnicity determines how they act or
think.144
How individuals “act or think” in policy spaces can be linked to particular
identity-based factions.145 Constitutional law and theory as articulated by the
Court reflects some of the effects that politicized identity has on politics, law,
representation, and community. In the case of voting and race, the Court has
stated that:
When the State assigns voters on the basis of race, it engages
in the offensive and demeaning assumption that voters of a
particular race, because of their race, “think alike, share the
same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at
the polls.” Race-based assignments “embody stereotypes that
treat individuals as the product of their race, evaluating their
thoughts and efforts—their very worth as citizens—according
to a criterion barred to the Government by history and the
Constitution.” They also cause society serious harm. . . . Racial
classifications with respect to voting carry particular dangers.
Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may
balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry
us further from the goal of a political system in which race no
longer matters—a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues to
aspire.146
In Holder v. Hall,147 the Court found that when “there is no objective
and workable standard for choosing a reasonable benchmark to evaluate a
challenged voting practice, it cannot be challenged as dilutive under Section
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Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Ariz.
Governing Comm’n v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1083 (1983)), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); see also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991) (“Race cannot be a
proxy for determining juror bias or competence.”); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984)
(“Classifying persons according to their race is more likely to reflect racial prejudice than
legitimate public concerns; the race, not the person, dictates the category.”).
Ortiz M. Walton, Toward a Non-Racial, Non-Ethnic Society, in MULTI-AMERICA, supra note 15, at
452. (“[R]acial and ethnic classifications are more ideological than scientific and frequently utilized
by politicians and demagogues for the purpose of divisiveness . . . are we yet at the point of just
becoming human beings sans ethnicity and race?”).
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911–12 (1995) (citations omitted).
512 U.S. 874 (1994).
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II” of the Voting Rights Act.148 Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia,
criticized vote dilution theory for redistricting, characterizing it as “a slightly
less precise mechanism than the racial register for allocating representation
on the basis of race.”149 Justice Thomas found that vote dilution claims based
on racial identity are underpinned by an assumption of actual or objective
cohesiveness of a politicized identity group and that “political cohesiveness,
as practically applied, has proved little different from a working assumption
that racial groups can be conceived of largely as [distinct] political interest
groups.”150 In Miller v. Johnson, however, Justice Ginsburg in her dissent
noted that, “ethnicity itself can tie people together . . . even people with
divergent economic interests. For this reason, ethnicity is a significant force
in political life.”151
V. NUANCES & PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH POLITICIZED IDENTITY
The employment of politicized identity by identity-based factions in
accruing power to shape public policy creates discursive conceptual loci that,
for better or worse—depending on one’s political and ideological orientation
vis-à-vis political community—directly impact the character and content of
representation.152 Identity politics generally speaking—and identity-based
factions specifically—have had the effect, to some degree, of reifying a
fragmented, as opposed to collective, sense of public policy and general
welfare.153 While it is indisputably important and necessary to capture the
diversity of the populace in policy spaces, formal politicized identity as the
148
149
150
151
152

Id. at 881.
Id. at 908 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 905.
Miller, 515 U.S. at 944 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
In analyzing arguments pertaining to the role of ethics in communitarian contexts, Ronald
Dworkin notes the different iterations of community have serious consequences for how a political
community is articulated in the political and legal process and in policy spaces:
Each of these arguments uses the concept of community in an increasingly more
substantial and less reductive way. The first argument, that a democratic majority has
a right to define ethical standards for all, uses community only as a shorthand symbol
for a particular, numerically defined, political grouping. The second argument, which
encourages paternalism, gives the concept more substance: It defines community not as
just a political group, but as the dimensions of a shared and distinct responsibility. The
third argument, that people need community, recognizes community as an entity in its
own right, as a source of a wide variety of influences and benefits not reducible to the
contributions of particular people one by one. The fourth argument, about
identification, further personifies community and describes a sense in which a political
community is not only independent of, but prior to, individual citizens.
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Dworkin, supra note 142 at 480.
Mukherjee, supra note 15, at 455–57. (“Language, race, religion, blood, myth, history, national
codes, and manners have all been used . . . in the US . . . to enforce terror, to ‘otherize’ . . . .
[Q]uestions such as who is an American and what is American culture are being posed with
belligerence and being answered with violence.”).
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singular means to do so in the overarching policy space may have the
consequence of balkanizing politics and exacerbating existing fissures.
Identity-based factions may have an adverse effect on the systemic national
community in order to highlight and protect the interests of the system’s subcommunities, the constitutive parts of the American polity. Alternatives to
politicized identity can perhaps be found in a shared and “explicitly expressed
[American] system of general ideas,”154 such as the Declaration of
Independence, U.S. Constitution, legal categories such as citizenship, and
procedural and substantive due process.
Politicized identity has high degrees of efficiency when it comes to
shaping the political and legal process and resultant public policy spaces
that, in turn, reflect an American political community. This is the case, in
part, because identity-based political factions are able to articulate interests
based on objectively ascertainable criteria that purport to capture the essence
of individual and group-based identity affiliation that goes to the core of what
members may feel is the touchstone of their being.155 Meaning and purpose of
a subject are conditioned by perceived membership in a group because it
functions as a repository of one’s sense of self. A problematic aspect of
politicized identity that lurks in the penumbras of representational politics is
that identity-based factional elites and entrepreneurs may be “confounding
conveniently abstracted features of human beings with [the] concrete totality
of these beings.”156 The politicized subject of an identity-based faction is
required to remain within the confines of a general panoramic context that
adheres to pre-established rules of constitution. In light of the foregoing, it
may be the case that:
[C]laims made on behalf of canonical identities or members of
canonical identity groups are just political claims, like claims
made on behalf of labor unions or gun owners or oil companies:
Gay marriage isn't necessarily weightier than the Family
Medical Leave Act; Title VII is just another regulation of the
market for labor, like the NLRA or ERISA.157
This type of contention is, of course, subject to critique and debate. The
perceptive lens one employs will directly affect how one assesses politicized
identity.
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BRUCE BAWER, THE VICTIM’S REVOLUTION: THE RISE OF IDENTITY STUDIES & THE CLOSING OF THE
LIBERAL MIND xiii (2012).
Politicized identity, and the identity-based factions that promulgate it, are reductivist in nature.
Each does not reflect the complex actuality of an individual subject. This “reduction of human
relations to ultra-tidy notions of group oppression results in an outrageously crude picture of the
world . . . plenty of people are oppressed—or ignored, mocked, or looked down upon—for reasons
other than race, class, gender, or sexual orientation.” Id. at 38.
SCHNEIDER, supra note 29, at 212.
Ford, supra note 2, at 53.
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Politicized identity, as the basis for political organization and
representation, has the potential of blurring the demarcation between
identity as a personal experiential state of affairs and identity as an objective
category that is deployed to create political- ideological platforms for the
purpose of organizing and affecting public policy in the name of identarian
policy claims. It “remains the case that neither language, nor religion, nor
nationality, nor shared moral or political views, is a likely candidate for the
communitarian symbol [of an American political community] that seems to be
a part of all true communities.”158 A virtue of formal politicized identity, on
the other hand, is that it helps create bonds of commonality among distinct
subgroups in the polity that allow for a degree of representation at the
macroscopic or national level. Marriage equality, for instance, can be viewed
as an attempt to enable pluralistic sub-communities to participate in a
universal institution.159 Yet, a pitfall seems to be that politicized identity is
also reductivist in that it de-diversifies individual subjects and sub-groups
within the larger umbrella group signifier. The power to name, to establish
authoritative and “true” signifiers to indicate objective signifiers, is
immanent in the power to identify, classify, and provide singular criteria for
inclusion or exclusion.160 What are the consequences for representational
politics as far as the larger political context that frames public policy?
Politicized identity is an act of imagination: a self and group affiliation “are
not primordial but historically produced[; in the case of race,] whiteness and
blackness were historically created and [are] historically variable
categories.”161
The contradiction inherent in identity politics as the basis for
representation is that politics and policy reflect a conception of the “world as
a multi-chrome mosaic of monochrome identity groups.”162 A “social group
should not be understood as an essence . . . with a specific set of common
attributes. Instead, group identity should be understood in relational terms. .
. . There is no common nature that members of a group have.”163 As a form of
legal, political, and cultural discourse, politicized identity communicates and
is packaged for public consumption based on its ability to perpetuate a
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Frederick Schauer, Community, Citizenship, and the Search for National Identity, 84 MICH. L. REV.
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See Gwendolyn M. Leachman, Institutionalizing Essentialism: Mechanisms of Intersectional
Subordination Within the LGBT Movement, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 655 (2016).
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Id. at 31.
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political and ideological discourse that is rooted in sameness, which provides
a means to exercise power via a hegemonic discourse.164
[Politicized identity provides] a systematized standard of
recognizability—of sameness—by which all others can be
assessed, regulated and allotted to a designated social location
. . . power formations not only function at the material level but
are also expressed in systems of theoretical and cultural
representation, political and normative narratives and social
modes of identification. There are neither coherent, nor rational
and their makeshift nature is instrumental to their hegemonic
force.165
Identity-based factions are thus products and producers of power—the power
to name, classify, designate, the gatekeepers who authoritatively define and
represent a politicized identity in policy spaces.166
Some critics have claimed that identity politics and the politics of
identification have created a “pseudo-politics of self-regard and increasingly
narrow and exclusionary self-definition.”167 An identity-based faction does
exert a unique influence on representative politics and policy spaces in that
politicized identity employs a “presumption of sameness, whether in the form
of universal moral equality or shared identity, [which] obscures biases,
nuances, and alternative visions.”168 Politicized “identity—in the
contemporary sense of an inner thing, a homunculus that needs tending to—
did not enter American political discourse until the late 1960s. It is more
exact to say that the founding problem of the United States was that of
political identification.”169 There is a difference between employing personal
identities for power and policy gains—for example, obtaining specific rights
164
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via the policy making process under the auspices of an entire class of people
that are grouped under an identity rubric as posited by elite stakeholders—
and the notion of identification with a restrictive formal identity-based
ideology.170 A negative effect of basing representation on identity-based
factions is that the subjects’ complexity is reduced to simplified politicized
traits that emphasize what identity elites feel are the most salient facets and
aspects of an identity in order to harness power.171 The politicized identitybased subject, emplaced within the confines of formal politicized identity, is
encouraged to engage “with the world and politics for the limited aim of
understanding and affirming what one already is”172 as defined by identity
elites and entrepreneurs that control public discourse vis-à-vis what
members actually want or need, the criteria of inclusion, and exclusion for
membership and “proper” conduct in the public and policy realms.
The problem of representation appears when the question is asked:
who exactly articulates, sets, defines, and pursues an agenda in the name of
the identity group? What are the power dynamics involved—how are
membership, experience, interests, and rights conceptualized, and for whom
and why? Is it really the case that identity groups are able to facilitate
authentic representation of the diversity of members that fall under the
classification of a formal politicized identity?
The notion of a group right requires the existence of an
identifiable group having an identifiable commonality of
pursuits or objectives, which may be regarded as the bearer, or
subject, of the right. Thus, a group right implicitly ascribes to
group members some type of unified identity—which creates an
inconsistency, or tension, between a denial of essentialist
premises and an affirmation of group-based rights.173
The issues posited as being of importance to the group—the defining of
interests, policies, goals, and rights—are all tied into identity and into the
170
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subject’s sense of self.174 This has the potential of creating polarizing and
non-negotiable spaces wherein it becomes difficult to accommodate the
differences that exist among diverse individuals and groups without an
umbrella identity to build on, such as national political identity or formal
citizenship or macroscopic ordering principles that can transcend niche
identity policy spaces.175 Interest, like identity, is not a static state of affairs;
interests are culled from select fragments of “current information,
consumption patterns, legal rules, and general social pressures.”176
Identity-based factions provide a fountainhead for political and legal
language that may have the effect of circumscribing broader engagement in
the public sphere. “Who is authorized to speak and about whom? Identity, in
other words, [has become] a sort of credential of authenticity authorizing
some to speak. It also authorized others to use identity to silence.”177
Underpinning authorization is the fact that politicized identity is a
normative, ethical postulation.178 As Cornel West notes, in the case of African
American identity, “any claim to black authenticity—beyond that of being a
potential object of racist abuse and an heir to a grand tradition of black
struggle—[relies] on one’s political definition of black interest and one’s
ethical understanding of [identity] to individuals and communities in and
outside black America.”179 Politicized identity, as proffered by an identitybased factional elite, is a normative and ethical construct. Trump supporters,
for instance, have felt free to revel in their politicized identity (“the silent
majority”) during the 2016 presidential campaign and post-election context,
deploying it against opponents.180 The same dynamic happens on the
174

175
176
177

178

179
180

See STEINBERG, supra note 15; Linda Nicholson, Identity after Identity Politics, 33 WASH. U. J. L. &
Pol’y 44 (2010).
See S.I. Benn, Interests in Politics, 60 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 123 (1960).
Cass R. Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, 20 PHILO. & PUB. AFF. 3, 10 (1991).
Cyra Akila Choudhury, In the Shadow of Gaslight: Reflections on Identity, Diversity, and the
Distribution of Power in the Academy, 20 CUNY L. REV. 467, 474 (2017).
Our society has come to the recognition that gay persons and gay couples cannot be
treated as social outcasts or as inferior in dignity and worth. For that reason the laws
and the Constitution can, and in some instances must, protect them in the exercise of
their civil rights. The exercise of their freedom on terms equal to others must be given
great weight and respect by the courts. At the same time, the religious and philosophical
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ideological left as well. Irrespective of ideological and normative
predispositions, “[i]dentity politics can dampen or smother democratic
political freedom.”181
Essentialism, that is, the notion that there are objective elements,
components that comprise identarian experience, is another facet of formal
politicized identity that has repercussions for representational politics.
[Essentialism] is embedded in the practice of elites who seek to
establish and maintain a position as “spokesmen” or “advocates
for” one or another “affinity group.” And it is embedded in the
practice of some rank and file “members” of such groups who,
by means of group opinion, seek to keep other “members” in
line.182
Essentialism is reductivist and tends to “one-dimensionalize” individual
subjects and sub-groups within a larger umbrella identity group.183 Humans
are complex; individually and collectively, they possess multidimensional
facets that comprise a singular being. An individual has layers of identitybased influences and meanings. Humans are “multi-identificational.”184
Layer in the power-based and interest-based motives that undergird
formulations of politicized identity in the political realm and these complex
dimensions become attenuated. Identity becomes an organizing device and
mechanism, by which to classify, name, and place subjects in hierarchical and
clearly defined trait- and experience-based modalities that are constitutive of
an objective identity-based state of affairs.
In our modern identity politics, it seems that trait-based criteria and
experience are deemed to reflect the presence of a deep-seated identity that
persists in space and time. This may be problematic in light of the shifting,
malleable, and plastic nature of social context and the sociality of facts,
epistemology, and the truth regimes that emerge from them. Thought,
conduct, and discourse thus seem to reflect a persistence of memory when it
comes to identity and not the fact that signifiers are arbitrary and subject to
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modification, disbandment, or reconfiguration. “Modern power requires
increasingly narrow categories through which it analyzes, differentiates,
identifies, and administers individuals.”185 Enter politicized identity. It is a
powerful mechanism that stems from “politics of language and speech” by
which to order, classify, name, place, and police discourse, proper expression
of interests, policy, goals, quality of life, and group criteria and conduct.186
Identity discourse thus interjects realness into classification, a persistent
trace of objective identity that resides deep in the recesses of the subject. This
is part of the process wherein an organic identity emerges, where the
sociality, the relative subjective of constructs, is discarded—irrespective of
the intent of the elite that articulate it.187
Politicized identity has the effect of coding the content of thought,
speech, and conduct, and qualifying who speaks, when, why, and how about
the interests, goals, issues, challenges, etc., which are vital to an identitybased group’s political wellbeing and public policy goals and aspirations.188
Identity-based politics is a composite of a multiplicity of discourses rather
than a singular one, and in a particular interpretation of identity, many
competing voices, iterations, and permutations are shut out from the political
process.189 Politicized identity discourse, which transforms identity into a
politicized mechanism and construct, provides “an analytical, visible, and
permanent reality; a principle of classification and intelligibility. . . . The
strategy behind this dissemination [is] to strew reality with [such principles]
and incorporate them into the individual.”190
Politicized identity is a construct that is propagated from within the
political realm. Facts are politicized, and thus facts can be appropriated in
the service of a politico-ideological program. The reality posited by politicized
facts that tell a specific narrative gleaned from a set of interpreted facts leads
to a conflation between objective and subjective facts. As a protestor in
Greenville, South Carolina stated in remonstrating drag queens reading
stories to children in the local public library: “I don’t see why their rights
should trump ours. It always seems in society today that’s what happens.
They want to be considered the victim; they want to have special rights.”191
The facts change based on the identarian lens applied: story time with drag
queens can also be factually seen as an inclusive affair that embraces
185
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diversity rather than as an assault on the particular values and norms of the
community. Politicized identity thus provides a singular account of facts and
seeks to disqualify competing discourses.
[I]dentity is contingent, neither the exclusive product of
individual choice nor the natural result of ascriptive racial or
gender characteristics or cultural heritage. Instead . . .
identities are conferred historically: “subjects are produced
through multiple identifications, . . . [and] the project of history
is not to reify identity but to understand its production as an
ongoing process of differentiation, . . . subject to redefinition,
resistance and change.” The point is that identity is not a given:
it is produced. Individuals’ identities are the product of both the
social forces that surround them and the identity labels that are
imposed on them and, to some degree, internalized by them.
Therefore, groups cannot be conceived of as categorically
distinct, because group boundaries themselves must vary as
persons shape their identities through interactions with other
groups and persons.192
Overall, politicized identity may have a negative impact on
representation and the positing of an American political community because
it blurs the distinction between truth and meaning, subjectivity, and
objectivity. There is a crucial distinction between meaning and truth:
Meaning attends to the significance we as humans attach to our
actions and existence, whereas truth refers to basic conditions
of existence within which our actions and our efforts to attain
meaning take place. . . . [T]ruth is irrelevant, even dangerous,
in the political sphere. In that sphere, citizens argue about
things, often about the best course of action for the collective to
undertake. . . . [T]he things we argue about have no right or
wrong answer.193
When politicized identity becomes the singular or primary basis of
performance, then the political becomes contestation for truth(s), not
meaning, and groups are locked into internal and external contests for
positing the correct identity interpretation to undergird and structure law
and policy. Truth compels, “and that is why it has no place in the political,
which deals with uncertain matters open to debate.”194 Identity as an
ideological program puts forth truth in place of meaning and creates
narrowly defined conduits in which to articulate policy spaces.
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The conflation of the personal with the public sphere of identity creates
issues for representational politics on a macroscopic level of analysis.
Identity, when explicitly politicized, does not become a means to an end but
rather an end itself. Politicized identity has the potential to emphasize
contestation and make it the centerpiece of policy, and the for-or-against
posture toward other groups can have an adverse effect on representation.195
It is important to keep in mind the levels on which politicized identity
operates: the micro and the macro, the individual and the collective, the
universal and the multifaceted view of identity and a national community.
Identity can become a medium of productivity, that is, obtaining specific
policy results, and in doing so can adversely affect the subgroups and
individuals that fall within the group as classified by elites that put forth and
operationalize an identity for policy purposes. “[A] common set of interests . .
. may or may not be racially based, and those who support them may or may
not be racially similar. Race, in this sense, becomes a political, not a
biological cue. It is chosen, not inherited.”196
VI. SELECT CONCLUSIONS
Politicized identity has played a profound role in the development of
the American political and legal process since the inception of the United
States as a political unit. Politicized identity and identity-based factions have
been with us since the beginning. In The Federalist, for instance, John Jay
(erroneously) posited the homogeneity and shared communitarian political
values of the nascent republic:
Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country
to one united people—a people descended from the same
ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same
religion, attached to the same principles of government, very
similar in their manners and customs, and who, by their joint
counsels, arms, and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a
long and bloody war, have nobly established general liberty and
independence. This country and this people seem to have been
made for each other . . . the design of Providence . . . for a band
of brethren, united to each other by the strongest ties . . . To all
general purposes we have uniformly been one people each
individual citizen everywhere enjoying the same national
rights, privileges, and protection.”197
Identity is an abstraction and a signifier that when politicized is presented as
capturing or approximating an objective reality in which subjects can be
195
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emplaced and ordered in the service of a specific ideological program, thereby
making a particular ideological program a nationally comprehensive one.
Elites that promulgate politicized identity are the ones who are forming a
political-ideological program based on its interpretation of what counts and
what actually matters in prioritizing the policy posture and interests and
goals of an identity group. The political program is part of a narrative that
“was made by somebody else [not the subject; the subject] does not belong to
the character of the story itself but only the mode in which it came into
existence.”198
Pluralistic identarian sub-communities are a very real and active part
of the American political and legal process and have been successful in
obtaining degrees of representative equity in modern policy spaces.
Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that the presentation of an
essentialist or organic identity as a logical and inevitable basis for politics
and policy rests on questionable grounds, irrespective of the motives for doing
so. There is a tension that exists between a universalist and a more nuanced
and complex pluralist sub-communities view of what constitutes an American
political community. Language is more than just a naming process, in that
naming is an act of power that bestows reality, concreteness, and tactility to
an abstraction in the realm of law, society, and politics.
Some people regard language, when reduced to its elements, as
a naming-process only—a list of words, each corresponding to
the thing it names . . . [This] assumes that ready-made ideas
exist before words . . . it lets us assume that the linking of a
name and a thing is a very simple operation—an assumption
that is anything but true . . . the [sign] unites, not a thing and
a name, but a concept and a sound-image.199
Herein is the power-basis of politicized identity, that is, the power to
circumscribe, cabin, and restrict the ebb and flow of fluid signifiers employing
an identarian lens. If the law can reflect a policy interest and goal of identitybased factions’ political and ideological agenda, then the law makes it
concrete and real, embedding identarian norms, values, morality, and
interpretations of the public weal into the legal and political process and
policy spaces.
An identity signifier is sociocultural in nature. This does not render
identarian groups or identity-based factions necessarily undesirable or
improper in the legal and political process that undergirds the U.S.
representative political system. But it is important to recognize some of the
problems, limitations, and tensions that emerge when attempting to posit the
why and how of the political process through identity-based factions: who are
the People, what exactly constitutes the political community reflected in the
198
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U.S. Constitution in the present time, and how is representation impacted by
the practice of identity politics and politicized identity as a mainstay in our
modern political and legal process? The significance of politicized identity
discourse, language, is that “only the associations [between a signifier and a
signified] sanctioned by that language appear to us to conform to reality, and
we disregard whatever others might be imagined. . . . The bond between the
signifier and the signified is arbitrary,”200 that is, there is no organic linkage
between the two.
Expression is the crucible in which identity is formed. Identity
cannot exist subjectively without the constitutive impact of
complex discursive systems, one of which is expression.
Discourses shape individual experiences of self-identification,
in part by a process of normalization that makes particular
differences matter. Ideas shape identity, and culture creates the
self, at least as much as the reverse. Identity is not a prediscursive, biological given.201
Indeed, “[b]ecause the members of almost any self-conscious social group
share some practices, norms, mannerisms, and narratives, all of the
canonical social groups of contemporary identity politics can be said to have a
distinctive culture.”202
Thus, identity discourse does not reflect an organic or objective state of
affairs. It is a means by which thought is given shape, contours, definition,
and this is an act of power.203 Meaning, purpose—identity politics seeks to
concomitantly fix these concepts in space-time. Politicized identity is more
form and less substance as far as providing a stable basis for representational
politics. What Saussure says about signs, that they function not through any
intrinsic value but through their relative position in the social context,204
applies to politicized identity because its use-value will vary according to its
use inside or outside political, sociocultural, and economic boundaries.205
Identity is laden with value. It is able to be marketed in a manner that
makes it palpable for mass consumption but also as a tool, an object that
produces and is a product of power in the sense that it procures conformity to
the mandates of the elites that embed their interests into the identity
construct.206 “It is on the basis of meaning that one will be master of
language, master of communication (even if the speech act and its modalities
200
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come into play in this mastery of discourse); it is on the basis of market value
that one will have mastery of the market.”207
Representation may be more robust when it is less beholden to
reductivist notions of this/that binary thinking, broadly conceived, avoiding
the “reproduction of the self from the reflections of the other.”208 A politics of
identity that is “not afraid of permanently partial identities and contradictory
standpoints”209 may be a counter to the reductivist binary basis of the present
politics of identity as it has played out on the political and legal stages.
Politicized identity can become a method of formalization and normalization
that can then become “instruments for enforcing meanings.”210 Political
identity codes subjects and seeks to provide a common, organic language in
which subjects are able to participate in a system of symbolic exchange,
wherein their empirical history, narratives, and experiences become unified
and homogenized to create force, energy, and support for politico-ideological
public policy programs as defined by the elite within the group/sub group.
Politicized identity builds on the notion that identity provides subjects
with a sense of self, meaning, purpose, and legibility within the discursive
matrix that constitutes order, society, and the normative, value, moral, and
principles that are constitutive of a subject’s perception and conduct in its
relations with other(s) and world(s). “But claims to these identities also have
legal import, as demands for public recognition or redistribution of resources,
cutting across domains such as employment, immigration, public benefits,
and tax law.”211 In a 2007 case dealing with racial classification in public
schools to allocate students in a large school district,212 the Court highlighted
an enduring issue regarding the deterministic capacity of politicized identity,
asserting that the Constitution forbids not simply race-conscious measures,
but rather “a classification that tells each student he or she is to be defined
by race.”213
Politicized identity is an expression ideology, one that seeks to procure
homogenization of individual subjects under an identity rubric, thereby
conflating the unity of form and content, and that seeks to authoritatively
establish the inner from the outer, absorb the individual subject into a
collective identity. A collective identity is held out as weighing more in
political calculi for influence, power, and control over public policy. Subjects
207
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experience themselves through the well-wrought category, classification
embedded in a politicized identity placeholder in the space of politics via the
politicized identity signifier. Representational politics has the potential to
ossify under the weight of politicized identity. Politicized identity, as a form
of ideology, “functions as an instrument of control. . . . [I]t becomes the
emphatic and systematic proclamation of what is.”214 We should not lose sight
of the effect that politicized identity has on the political and legal process,
how it affects and effects notions of political community, and how conduct and
perception are processed and expressed on the national political stage, the
political and legal process, and in policy spaces.
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